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Constitutional Changes, Transitional
Justice, and Legitimacy: The Life and
Death of Argentina's "Amnesty" Laws
By JOSE SEBASTIAN ELIAS
I. Introduction
Argentina has a long history of authoritarian government, with a
good portion of the twentieth century characterized by military
dictatorships. This environment has hindered the development of a
liberal constitutional practice of government, one that is consistent
with the rule of law and that places a high value on individual rights
and on the value of autonomy.1 The most serious interruption of
constitutional order took place between 1976 and 1983, when a
military government ruled the country with an iron fist under the
pretext of fighting the communist guerrilla. In this process,
* I am indebted to Bruce Ackerman for his insightful criticisms and comments on
an earlier version of this paper. Another version of this piece was presented at the
Latin American Human Rights and Legal Theory Workshop at the Leitner Center
for International Law and Justice, at Fordham Law School, where I received useful
comments and criticisms from Jorge Contesse, Juan Gonzalez Bertomeu, Ruti
Teitel, and other assistants. I have also benefited from long conversations on the
topic with Leonardo Filippini, Marcelo Alegre, and Samuel Ferguson. Julio Rivera
read a previous draft and made useful comments, and Santiago Gascon gave me
more than a helping hand with bibliography at a distance. Last, but not least,
Elizabeth Klebaner, Erica Yen, Alicia Miller and the editorial team at the Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review did a great job on this piece, helping
make it more accurate and readable. To all of them I am truly grateful. Obviously,
unanswered criticisms and any other shortcomings remain my responsibility.
1. See CARLOS S. NINO, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSITUCIONAL:
ANALISIS FILOSOFICO, JURIDICO Y POLITOLOGICO DE LA PRACrICA CONSTITUCIONAL
106-57 (1992).
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commonly known as the "Dirty War," the dictatorship engaged in the
systematic commission of countless crimes, establishing a parallel
criminal, yet state-run, organization aimed at annihilating the
subversive element at any cost. Heinous crimes were committed, and
many people disappeared, leaving their families forever ignorant of
their fate. A few lucky people regained freedom after abduction and
torture, but many more died in bombings and terrorist attacks. This
dark phase in Argentina's history left deep wounds in the social fabric
of the country, and we are still trying to heal them.
Predictably, our society has had serious troubles in its attempts
to re-establish a liberal constitutional democracy. One of the most
important obstacles Argentina has faced is attaining transitional
justice. We have struggled with this issue throughout the last twenty-
three years, unable to reach a definitive solution, much less one that
would satisfy a sufficient portion of the population. After the
democratic restoration, the topic of corrective justice has had a
profound influence on the legitimacy of our constitutional process,
and continues to influence it today.
Not unlike the United States, Argentina has a written
Constitution. Its original text was drafted in 1853, and then revised in
1860. There have been some minor reforms over time, but until 1994
the text remained essentially the same since its enactment. The
Constitution's observance, however, has suffered from a variety of
institutional illnesses ranging from instability to plain derogation.
Nonetheless, the original Constitution has remained in force, even if
only symbolically, for the majority of its existence.2 In this way, the
Constitution has functioned as a symbol of unity and identity for the
People. So much so that even the worst violators of the Constitution
claimed that they were trying to 'defend' it and preserve it, and none
dared to formally abrogate it.
In 1983, after the restoration of civil government, the
Constitution was not replaced by a new higher law, nor was it
amended. Instead, it was re-established as the "supreme law of the
land.",3 Subsequently in 1985, under the authority of the original
2. Except for a brief period between 1949 and 1955, when it was replaced by the
1949 Peronist Constitution, later abrogated by the so-called 'Revolucion Libertadora'
in 1955. U.S. Dep't of State Background Note: Arg. (2008),
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26516.htm#history>.
3. Between 1976 and 1983, the historic Constitution was subordinated to the
"basic goals" and the "revolutionary statute" enacted by the Military Junta. But it
was not formally repealed. A new legality, topped by the "revolutionary" rules, was
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Constitution, the Government of President Alfonsin brought the
main military leaders to justice: Several former members of the
Military Juntas were convicted, and the Supreme Court affirmed their
convictions. Then in 1987, the Congress passed two bills that were
functionally equivalent to amnesty for all intermediate rank officers.
As an independent political maneuver, President Menem pardoned a
number of military officers and guerrillas in 1990. Those officers and
guerillas that were pardoned had already been convicted, while others
were standing trial.
Four years later the Constitution went through some important
reforms. In 1994, a Constitutional Convention was called in an
attempt to modernize our constitutional framework. Individual
guarantees were explicitly reinforced, while the classic dogmatic part
of the Constitutional text remained untouched.! In 2004 and 2005, the
Supreme Court handed down two very important decisions touching
on the issue of transitional justice. While the Court's decisions on the
merits of the two cases were received warmly, the doctrinal
foundations of these decisions have proved highly controversial. The
decisions in these two cases, Arancibia Clavel and Simon,' at least on
their face, clashed with some of the most time-honored principles of
modern liberal criminal law. Principles that had long been secured by
the Constitution. Specifically, the decisions were in derogation of the
prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws. In Arancibia Cla vel, the
Supreme Court declared that crimes against humanity were not
covered by statutes of limitations of any kind, because international
customary law and conventional obligations had displaced the
applicable domestic rules.' In Simon, the Supreme Court expanded
established. Felipe Aguero, Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the
Military, and Democracy in South America, 42 MERSHON INT'L STUDIES REV. 383,
383-388 (1998).
4. The "dogmatic" part contains the declarations and fundamental principles of
the regime, as well as the individual rights and guarantees. It could be characterized
as the functional equivalent of the "Bill of Rights" of the U.S. Constitution. EMILIO
J. CARDENAS & MARIANO GARCIA RUBIO, NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED
NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, (Vera Gowiland-Debbas & Djacoba
Tehindrazanarivelo eds., 2005).
5. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/8/2004, "Arancibia Clavel, Enrique
Lautaro y otros" Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [Fallos] (2004-327-3294) (Arg.).
6. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, "Julio Hdctor Sim6n y otros,"
Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos]
(2005-328-2056) (Arg.) (translated by author).
7. See "Arancibia Clavel," supra note 5, at § 38 (Zaffaroni, J., and Highton de
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upon the principles set forth in Arancibia Gavel, declaring
unconstitutional the 1987 Congressional "amnesty" bills. Not only
did these decisions seemingly contradict foundational principles of
Argentina's legal order, but standing together they also overruled the
precedent set by Camps where the Court had seemingly settled the
matter with a contradictory ruling some eighteen years earlier.
Is there any substantial relationship between the sequence of
facts I have depicted and the outcome of these two cases? Did
President Alfonsin fail to "constitutionalize" the civic euphoria that
followed democratic restoration? What role, if any, did the military
trials play in legitimatizing the reconstruction of constitutional
democracy in Argentina? Is it possible to give an alternate narrative
of today's Supreme Court decisions that helps understand the larger
framework of their constitutional legitimacy? Or is the Supreme
Court, in developing Argentina's constitutional culture, merely a
political actor: is "just politics," all we are left with? Are we facing a
revolution led by the Court? These are questions I will attempt to
answer in the pages that follow.
II. Looking Backward
In order to better understand the current constitutional order in
Argentina, it is necessary to take a glance at how the country got to
where it is today, and how this history has contributed to the
constitutional revolution led by the Supreme Court. Let us then go
back to 1983.
A. 1983: A True 'New Beginning' or Just a Simple Restoration ?
By the time Raul Alfonsin was elected President by democratic
means in 1983 the country was exhausted. It had expended much of
its moral reserve on seven years of harsh military dictatorship,
characterized by systematic violations of human rights. But the
violence and institutional decline had begun much earlier. Even the
democratic governments of 1973 and 1976 had not been much of a
break for a society shaken by political instability and recurrent
Nolasco, J., concurring), § 24 (Petracchi, J., concurring), §§ 30, 35 (Boggiano, J.,
concurring), §§ 74, 77 (Maqueda, J., concurring) (translated by author).
8. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 22/06/1987, "Camps, Ram6n Juan
Alberto y otros / Causa incoada en virtud del decreto 280/84 del Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[Fallos] (1987-310-1162) (Arg.).
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authoritarianism. For the last fifty-three years, the country had
endured repetitive cycles of weak and brief civil governments,9
followed by military rule. Argentina needed respite.
Whether it would get it was not very clear until the ballots were
in. The Peronist party had been the dominant force on the political
scene for almost forty years. It had never been defeated in any
election it had been permitted to enter. Even when forbidden, the
Peronist party continued to have an enormous influence on electoral
results. It was only natural that many erroneously believed that the
Peronist candidate, Italo Luder, would become the next president."0
But he did not, of course, and Raul Alfonsin was chosen to run the
country in 1983.
Much more than partisanship was at stake; the method by which
Argentina would resume its democracy and constitutional life would
depend heavily on who won the election. The difference lay in
whether Argentina would try to build a liberal constitutional practice
that reflected the aspirations of a mobilized society, or whether it
would simply bridge the gap between 1976 and 1983, and pretend that
nothing had happened in between. Alfonsin and Luder chose to face
the electorate with proposals that were radically different in one
essential point: the scope of the change in our institutional structure.
While Alfonsin represented a new generation of politicians,
associated with the possibility of deep changes, Luder had strong
links to Argentina's violent past" and offered the prospective of
continuity. The 1983 presidential election was crucial to Argentina's
new political order.
The military dictatorship had begun with strong civilian support.
Many people were tired of the increasing violence of the mid-1970s,
9. With the exception of Peron's presidency from 1946 to maybe 1953-54. U.S.
Dep't of State Background Note: Arg. (2008), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/26516.htm#history> (visited April 7, 2008).
10. The military dictatorship was among those who were confident in a Peronist
victory in the October election. Not only did they have reasons to think so, but they
also had motives for hoping so. I will elaborate further below.
11. Even when he himself had not participated in violent actions, he had signed,
during his tenure in Isabel Peron's constitutional government, the decrees ordering
the "annihilation of the subversive guerrilla" that the military used as legal
justification at the beginning of the so-called "Dirty War." IRENE MUNSTER, FROM
NORWICH TO THE PAMPAS AND BACK: THE ARCHIVE OF RABBI MARSHALL T. MEYER
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and believed that the generals could fill the growing power vacuum,
and re-establish peace and order. They were right about the former,
but wrong about the latter. Instead of peace, there was terror and
with it came the societal fractures that still haunt us today. As time
passed, support for the regime faded away. The disappearances, the
abhorrent methods used by the Armed Forces in the "war against the
communist guerrilla," and the lack of a coherent and efficient
economic management was a noxious political cocktail that most
people were not willing to sip any longer. Moreover, the
international community ceased to be tolerant of human rights
violations. Criticism of the regime flowed from both internal and
external sources, and the military regime was ill equipped to respond
to them. The Junta rapidly lost its ground in the moral battle for
national security.12
The Malvinas war brought a brief return of popular support to
the Military Junta, which decided to regain by force the Islas
Malvinas from the British. The ostensible legitimacy of the cause
made people forget about the illegitimacy of their rulers, and worse,
about the futility and the ill-timing of this military campaign. Despite
the huge costs that the war had for Argentina, in both human and
political terms, it did have one positive effect for the country, namely,
contributing to the decisive collapse of the military regime. 3 The
generals, blaming one another for the disastrous results of their ill-
conceived military escapade, had time only to call for general
elections and attempt to negotiate protection from criminal
prosecution.' They were not successful in the latter task, probably
12. The repression had reached unbeknown levels, and the charges - sustained
both by western governments and different internal groups - of state terrorism were
undeniable. The regime lacked the possibility of neutralizing the criticism in the
world of moral power, where ideology, justification and utopias meet, and play a
significant role. Obviously, it was a world in which the dictatorship was frankly
vulnerable. See CARLOS FLORIA & CESAR GARCIA BELSUNCE, LA ARGENTINA
POLITICA 254 (El Ateneo, Buenos Aires 2005).
13. See ELIN SKAAR, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE PARADOX OF
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 71 (Chr. Michelsen Institute 1994). See also CARLOS S.
NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 43 (Yale Univ. Press, New Haven and London 1996).
But see J. PATRICE MCSHERRY, INCOMPLETE TRANSITION: MILITARY POWER AND
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA 9 (St. Martin's Press 1997) (arguing that Argentina's
transition does not fit well in the "collapse" category, and that it is, perhaps, better
explained as somewhere in the middle between "transitions by extrication" and
"transitions by reform").
14. See MARCOS NOVARO & VICENTE PALERMO, LA DICTADURA MILITAR [THE
MILITARY DICTATORSHIP] 477-78, 501-07 (2003) (translated by author).
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due to their lack of political leverage following Argentina's defeat. 5
The collapse of military rule opened a wide range of
opportunities for democratization. Many possibilities for building a
fuller democracy were at hand. 6 And it was now up to Alfonsin and
Luder to decide whether and how to take the available opportunities
and fill the remnant power vacuum.
Alfonsin won the election with almost 52 percent of the total
votes and a majority in the Electoral College. 7 Was the 1983 election
the mark of a true "new beginning' ' 18 or was it just a democratic
restoration? The question is legitimate since one of the options in the
national debate was precisely the "institutional and political
continuity" offered by Luder. Failure to enact a new Constitution
immediately after the fall of the military dictatorship implied a certain
degree of legal continuity. After all, constitutional lawmaking is
frequently a potent symbolic marker of break with the past.'9 Yet can
a political regime that began by restoring a 130 year-old constitutional
text - violated more frequently than observed during the previous
fifty-three years - be described as a "new beginning?"
However, the year 1983 was, indeed, a new beginning for
Argentina. There was no new constitutional text, but there was a
clear break with the devilish National Security State model that had
been developed by the Military Junta.'
The election signaled the break between authoritarian rule and
constitutional democracy. Moreover, it marked the divide between
traditional politics and a new perspective on the Argentine Res
Publicae. The electoral results marked the epilogue of an era and the
probable prologue to a new order.' Writing in 1983, Alain Rouquie
15. Id. at 509.
16. See MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 7; see also NOVARO & PALERMO, supra
note 14, at 547 (emphasizing the factors that hindered taking full advantage of the
opportunities).
17. Argentina's presidential election system was indirect and used an electoral
college until the 1994 Constitutional Reform. See CONST. ARG. ART. 94.
18. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
771, 778 (1997).
19. Id.
20. See MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 1, 59-83. She argues, convincingly, that the
military coups of 1966 and 1976 were qualitatively different from the previous
dictatorships. From 1966 on, the military rulers took complete control of the state
machine, and establish a totalitarian model of state based on the National Security
Doctrine.
21. See FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 12, at 268.
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emphasized that:
Perhaps never before has Argentina society reached such a level of
entropy or come so close to disintegration and loss of its
identity... [t]he barely tolerated appearance of an antimilitarism
which is as new as it is uncontrollable leads one to think that,
according to the traditional phrase, nothing will ever be the same
22again.
Novaro and Palermo23 have described the situation prior to 1983
as,
the dismantling of the military power would encourage the most
perspicacious political actors, and through them, ample sectors of
society, to aspire to a new democratic founding that were not a
mere repetition of previous transitions and exits, but a definitive
cut with long decades of institutional instability and military
'pretorianism.
Subsequent historical developments would prove that a
fundamental change had occurred. Although there were more than a
few opportunities in which different conditions (economic as well as
political) shook Alfonsin's government - and, on fewer occasions
Menem's as well 25 - the people never again entertained the possibility
of asking for military help, as they had done so frequently in the past.
On the contrary, when democracy was endangered, the people
mobilized in strong support of it.26 Coup d'etats were definitively
rejected as a political solution to frequent frustrations.
The 1983 election was an usual election in that casting a vote had
a powerful meaning for many.27 Political apathy was at an
22. See Alain Rouquie, The Departure. of the Military-End of the Political Cycle
or Just Another Episode, 59 INT'L AFF. 575, 576 (1983) (emphasis added).
23. See NOVARO & PALERMO, supra note 14, at 468 (emphasis added).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Even in the deep crisis of 2001-2002, when people demonstrated massively
against the government, there was no support at all for an eventual intervention for
the Army in politics.
26. During the dangerous carapintada rebellion of Easter 1987, approximately
50,000 people, responding to the call of the government, surrounded the Campo de
Mayo garrison, where the rebellion was taking place, in support of democracy. Many
other places around the city of Buenos Aires were filled with demonstrators against
the rebellion. See MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 214. The General Confederacy of
Labor announced a general strike in support of democracy. See NINO, supra note 13,
at 97. The rest of the country followed the development of the events with anxiety
and similar manifestations of rejection to military threats against democracy.
27. Of course, elections could hardly be considered "usual" in those times in
[Vol. 31:2
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extraordinary low level. 8 The people had been mobilized: many
closely followed the progression of the campaigns, and were highly
receptive to any signals sent by the political parties.
The period of mobilization had begun around 1981 when the
erosion of the military regime was becoming evident and the changing
conditions started to hinder the possibility of military continuity. On
July 14th, following an initiative of Alfonsin's Party, the Union Civica
Radical (Radical Civil Union or "UCR"), a number of political
parties founded the Multipartidaria (National Multi-Party
Organization), which was later joined by almost all political parties.
Multipartidaria represented the whole range of political thought and
disparate movements were mobilized as a consequence of their
involvement."
In June of 1982, the Multipartidaria released the "Program for
the National Reconstruction," This document was completely silent
about the human rights violations that had occurred, but emphasized
the necessity of reinstating the 1853 Constitution. However, the issue
of human rights would become central to the electoral campaign after
the military defeat in Malvinas changed the relationships between
military leaders and civil society.3  By the end of 1982, the
Multipartidaria gathered 80,000 people in Plaza de Mayo, in support
of democratic restoration." Civil society was flourishing and political
party membership was renewed with unprecedented force.32 The need
to feel a sense of belonging and civil participation became truly
important, and many joined the political party of their choice as the
manifestation of this need.
Argentina.
28. See, e.g., NOVARO & PALERMO, supra note 14, at 502 (arguing that, by the
time the military regime collapsed, public opinion had long abandoned the anti-
political inclinations that were dominant during the beginnings of the dictatorship,
and that Argentine society was "massively democratic and mobilized").
29. Id. at 375-78, 396-97, 406-07, 512 (describing the formation of the
Multipartidaia, the different positions within the coalition, and the difficulties it had
every time a new political sector tried to be included in the coalition, as well as its
aspirations of representing a wide range of political positions as a means to gain
legitimacy).
30. Id. at 476.
31. Id. at 501. But see MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 108 (stating 100,000 as the
number of people in the same demonstration).
32. See, e.g., "La Eleccion Presidencial: Los Padrones como Instrumento de
Poder," DIARIO CLARIN, Jan. 18, 2003, available at
<http://www.clarin.com/diario/2003/01/18/p-01101.htm> (visited Nov. 8, 2006).
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The issue of the crimes committed by the dictatorship, and
transitional justice, gradually reached the center of the political
debate. On August 19, 1983, barely two months before the general
elections, 40,000 people marched to Plaza de Mayo in opposition to
rumored self-amnesty for the military.33
The two competing presidential candidates, Alfonsin and Luder,
took significantly different stances on human rights. Alfonsin
explicitly rejected the amnesty proposal announced by the outgoing
military government, which advocated that the crimes committed
during political repression should be judged by history alone and not
by the civilian courts." On the other hand, Luder's position was that,
according to the prohibition of ex post facto criminal laws, any self-
amnesty that was issued by the Junta would have a permanent effect
due to the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto criminal laws.35
While Alfonsin rejected off-hand the possibility of a "pacted"
transition, Luder favored such a possibility.36
There were further indicators that a Peronist victory would likely
result in military impunity: the grant of amnesty to right-wing military
leaders;37 the return of trade union property and the possible
33. See NINO, supra note 13, at 64.
34. See "It Is Not the Final Word," May 2, 1983, Response of Presidential
Candidate Raul Ricardo Alfonsin to the "Final Report on the War against
Subversion and Terrorism" issued by the Military Junta (on file with author).
Alfonsin stated clearly that it would by civilian Justice and not history that would
judge crimes committed between 1976 and 1983, and that no personal privileges
contrary to the 1853 Constitution would be allowed. See, e.g., Diario Los Andes,
Mendoza, Argentina, May 3, 1983, at 1, 4. The argument is explained in fuller detail
in RAUL ALFONSIN, AHORA: MI PROPUESTA POLITICA 141-49 (Sudamericana-
Planeta, Buenos Aires 1983).
35. See JOAQUIN MORALES SOLA, ASALTO A LA ILUSION 131 (Planeta, Buenos
Aires 1991). Morales Sola argues, however, that Luder's stance was more precise
legally than politically. Such assertion is, frankly, quite disputable. It seems to me that
the constitutional invalidity of such de facto self-amnesty law was a plausible legal
position, and so it might have been considered, on the political realm, the grant of an
amnesty - which would not have been more than following a long-established
tradition. If anything, one could argue that there was more political accuracy than
legal accuracy in Luder's position.
36. See MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 108. But see JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE
BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 191-92 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2004) (holding that deals were struck secretly and that Alfonsin promised
that "only a limited number of officers would have to be tried, and that even these
would be granted an amnesty at the end of his term"). However, Elster offers no
support for his assertion and the bibliography, if anything, seems to point in the
opposite direction.
37. See FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 12, at 283.
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resumption of the unions' (the base of the Peronist party's support)3 8
management of welfare activities; the connection between right-wing
Peronism and para-military force;3 9 the role Luder had played in
executive orders authorizing the military to suppress guerrilla
activities; ' the Peronist party's support for authoritarianism,
nationalism and anti-communism;' and many others. The
confluence of these factors virtually guaranteed that no legal action
would be taken against the military if the Peronist party were to win
the 1983 election.43
In contrast to Peronist leaders, Alfonsin saw clearly, from the
very beginning of the military's decline, the opportunities that would
be offered by its collapse and tried to distance himself from the ideas
and the symbols associated with the old regime. Immediately after the
Malvinas defeat, Alfonsin made his political position clear by stating
that, "the Armed Forces do not deserve this destiny, and the country
does not deserve that government, which must go now; the usurpation
must cease and a process of civil transition towards democracy must
begin today."" Deolindo Felipe Bittel, a popular Peronist politician
38. See Alberto J. Pla, Eljusticialismo en elpoder en Argentina, in HOMBRES Y
MOMENTOS DE LA ARGENTINA: ROCA, YRIGOYEN, PALACIOS, PERON, FRONDIZI 149
(1975) (translated by author).
39. The connection between Isabel Peron's close advisor, Jose Lopez Rega, and
the infamous "Triple A" right-wing para-miltary force is well known. See, e.g.,
Argentina's 'Triple A' death squads, BBC NEWS, Dec. 29, 2006, available at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/6216431.stm> (visited Mar. 30, 2008).
40. The military junta, in its document "Final Report," had taken care to remind
the population about Luder's role in the executive orders authorizing the military to
suppress guerrilla activities.
41. Peronism covered a wide range of political positions, and Peronist politicians
have embraced widely different political programs throughout time. However, it is at
least arguable that there are important authoritarian components in its history. One
should not forget that Peron himself was a prominent member of the 1943 de facto
government. The nationalistic elements have also been present in the Party's themes,
and they appear intertwined with anti-communist topics. See, e.g., Pla, supra note 38,
at 146-48 (arguing that Peronism can be included, without any difficulties, in the
nationalistic positions that arose in post-WWII Latin America, and that Peron's
stances represented a second kind of nationalism, defined by anti-imperialism and, at
the same time, extreme anti-communism).
42. In general, the military officers were well-aware of all these signals, and that's
why they generally preferred that Luder won the elections and not Alfonsin. They
saw a Peronist victory as a lesser evil. See, e.g., Rosendo M. Fraga, Las Fuerzas
Armadas (1973-1983), in 8 NUEVA HISTORIA DE LA NACION ARGENTINA 261 (2001)
(translated by author).
43. See Rouquie, supra note 22, at 585.
44. NOVARO & PALERMO, supra note 14, at 465, n.5 (quoting La Naci6n, June
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chose a different political strategy. In his speech in front of Peron's
tomb, he said:
When the Armed Forces decided to attempt the recovery of the
Islands... we acted as you taught us. The Nation comes first. We
postponed our legitimate claims and... we stood by the
combatant... and denounced to the world the enemy of the
Peoples, the imperialism and colonialism that you fought all
through your life. Latin America and the Third World understood
us and supported us, and all the visionary grandeur of the 'Third
Position' policy that you held four decades earlier was revealed.
Even your most persistent enemies had to walk the path that you
led ....
Even in the face of the military's defeat and the failed invasion of
the Mavinas, the war seemed to be a victory under Peronist ideology
and rhetoric.45 Peronist leaders did not seem to grasp the way in which
Argentina was changing. There would be no room for authoritarian
rhetoric and extreme nationalist positions. Bittel, Luder, and the old-
guard union leaders were trapped in the past that, suddenly, seemed
long gone to the people of Argentina.
Alfonsin was the only candidate that could be called "new" in
more than one sense of the word. He had not been part of the
military government, nor had he been affiliated with violence and
political intolerance, as was the case with the Peronist party. On the
contrary, he had been an active participant in the human rights
movement, and arrived at the crucial electoral moment as the
alternative for true political change. He offered the possibility of a
culture open to pluralist constitutional democracy, while at the same
time was very critical of authoritarian ideology. He presented himself
as the most democratic candidate, focusing his campaign on the
rejection of the authoritarian past, and making a strong claim to
revive political participation as an intrinsic value of the new political
order.
The 1853 Constitution was the central theme of Alfonsin's
campaign. ' The search for a democratic institutional framework was
on. Alfonsin offered a political prospect that was attractive to a large
sector of the population. His rhetoric, while displaying some anti-
oligarchy, populist leanings, also relied on constitutional themes. He
15, 1982).
45. See NOVARO & PALERMO, supra note 14, at 465, n.5.
46. See FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 12, at 267.
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was drinking not only from Yrigoyen, the great Radical caudillo of
the early twentieth century, but also partially from Peron 7 and,
ultimately, he embodied the accurate synthesis of the transitional
moment.48
"Reciting the Preamble of the Constitution, invoking the
preeminence of the law over the sheer force, counter-pointing the
civil and political rights of the citizens against the military and the
authoritarian management style of the trade unions, would be the
central topics of a strategy that essentially aimed at giving an epic
extent to the change of regime.4 ' Alfonsin understood the
foundational possibility that was open at that historical moment," and
worked hard to make sure that his proposal conveyed precisely the
idea of a fundamental change and a break from the past.
His position as the only credible candidate, who would bring the
worst perpetrators of heinous crimes to justice, has been widely
regarded as the main cause of his electoral victory." We cannot know
47. Alfonsin's reliance of populist and anti-oligarchy themes was inspired by both
Yrigoyen and Peron, while his emphasis on the Constitution was something born out
of his own appreciation of the historical circunstance. Neither Peron, nor Yrigoyen
had been champions of constitutional discourse.
48. Hipolito Yrigoyen embodied the early twentieth century fight for popular
sovereignty and universal vote. His party defined itself as a cause against the
"oligarchic regime," and its rhetoric focused on political participation, within the
limits of the Constitution. Yrigoyen reached power after the enactment of the
"universal and mandatory voting law." See Marta H. Cavilliotti, La causa contra el
regimen en la Argentina, in HOMBRES Y MOMENTOS DE LA HISTORIA ARGENTINA:
ROCA, YRIGOYEN, PLACIOS, PERON, FRONDtzI 62-65 (1975). See also FELIX LUNA, 1
HIPOLITO YRIGOYEN: PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO 234-35 (1956) (translated by author).
Later, Peron would build his political project based upon the idea of social justice,
which would occupy the center of his thought. See, e.g., RICARDO M. ZUCCHERINO,
HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINA 483-84 (2007) (translated by author). Thus,
the populist themes Alfonsin was using in his campaign recognize as antecedents
both Yrigoyen and Peron. The constitutional themes, although also used in the past,
were something more characteristic of the historical moment Alfonsin was facing.
49. See NOVARO & PALERMO, supra note 14, at 518 (emphasis added).
50. See Juan Carlos Portantiero, Prologo, in RAUL ALFONSIN, MEMORIA
POLITICA - TRANSICION A LA DEMOCRACIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS 14 (Fondo de
Cultura Economica, Buenos Aires 2004) (arguing that Alfonsin would later try to
carry out an institutional re-founding, through a wide array of measures,
encompassing the corrective justice effort as well as his initiative to reform the
Constitution and the proposal - turned into law but never implemented - of moving
the Federal Capital out of Buenos Aires to Viedma).
51. See MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 110; see also SKAAR, supra note 13 at 73;
Kathryn Lee Crawford, Due Obedience and the Rights of Victims. Argentina's
Transition to Democracy, 12:1 HuM. RTs. Q. 17, 20 (1990), who emphasizes that
Alfonsin's Party (UCR) had a human rights platform in the 1983 election, and that
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for sure to what extent this was so. However, we can be reasonably
certain that Alfonsin's attitude toward human right violations and
transitional justice did play a role in the landslide victory he achieved.
Alfonsin won the elections, against all odds, because he was able
to synthesize the values and loyalties the People wanted to retain and
those they wanted to replace. Unlike Luder, he embodied a concrete
proposal to make 1983 a turning point in Argentina's history. 2
However, whether the transformation process ultimately lived up to
the expectations it had generated is a different question altogether.
The day Raul Alfonsin was inaugurated as President, Argentine
People signed a new social contract.53
B. The Military Trials and the Lack of a New Constitution
The new social contract was signed over an old, venerable, pre-
determined model without any chance to add or subtract from this
model. The 1853 Constitution served as the model for the "new
beginning" the country was trying to establish. Why was this so? Are
not constitutional texts, when backed up by the legitimacy of popular
consent, powerful symbols of a "new beginning?" More importantly,
are they not the very possibility of projecting the salient features of
the "new beginning" into the future: unifying the People and helping
the Nation to go through turbulent times" without relapsing into old
practices. New constitutional lawmaking provides an opportunity to
gain the support of the political elite and also to commit them to
"play by the rules they made themselves."55 Why then, did Alfonsin
not try to embed his vision of the "new beginning" into a new
constitutional text; and why did Argentineans decide to sign their
brand-new social contract on an old sheet of paper instead of using a
new one?
There may be various reasons why things turned out as they did.
It surely was not the case that Alfonsin did not want a new
Alfonsin was elected on such electoral promises.
52. See JORGE VANOSSI, LA REFORMA DE LA CONSTITUCION 125 (Emece,
Buenos Aires 1988).
53. See Dardo Perez Guilhou, El Constitucionalismo, in 7 NUEVA HISTORIA DE
LA NACION ARGENTINA-506 (Academia Nacional De La Historia, Planeta, Buenos
Aires 2001).
54. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE LIBERAL REVOLUTION 2 (Yale
Univ. Press 1992).
55. ld. at 62.
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Constitution.6 And it may be true that he enjoyed an extraordinary
level of political support and moral legitimacy during the first two
years of his administration.57 It may be, as Ackerman argues, that
Alfonsin just squandered his moral capital on criminal trials, 8 missing
the chance to enact a new Constitution before the "constitutional
moment" rapidly passed. But there may still be a slightly different
story to tell.
Although many times disobeyed, especially after 1930, the 1853
Constitution was a document that required much sacrifice to
conclude. Since at least the Federal Pact of 1832, the various
Argentinean provinces had been trying to attain their constitutional
charter in a highly convulsed political environment. In spite of the
serious obstacles that the provinces had to overcome, and after long
years of on and off civil war, they finally enacted the Constitution.59 It
was enacted as a result of a long process of popular mobilization, and
thus, the dualist conception of democracy would give it the highest
degree of legitimacy.6° So the 1853 Constitution was not a bad
starting point at all. Or so Alfonsin may have thought.
Much in the way standard commercial contracts are used to
make transactions easier by reducing transaction costs, the 1853
56. In conversation, Marcelo Alegre, a constitutional scholar and legal
philosopher who worked close to Alfonsin's team in the elaboration of a proposal of
constitutional reform around 1986, suggested that Alfonsin may have not entertained
the idea of a constitutional reform before 1985-1986. However, soon after the
Military Government invaded the Islas Malvinas, Alfonsin - taking the lead for the
post-war period - proposed that the Multipartidaria designed a transitional president,
whose main tasks would be to pave the way for a constitutional reform in the short-
term and to call to free elections. His candidate for the position was former president
Arturo Illia (from Alfonsin's own party). The proposal was rejected by Illia himself,
and by the Multipartidaria, but its existence shows that the idea of constitutional
reform was present in Alfonsin's mind before the 1983 election. See, e.g., NOVARO &
PALERMO, supra note 14, at 470; see also MORALES SOLA, supra note 35, at 114
(arguing that in the 1983-1985 period the idea of a constitutional reform was
entertained only by the most extreme sectors of alfonsinism, and that it was only after
1985 that the topic became a concern for the administration.).
57. See MORALES SOLA, supra note 35, at 33.
58. See ACKERMAN, supra note 54, at 80.
59. Almost thirty-seven years had to pass since independence for Argentina's
people to unite as one nation (1816-1853). There had been previous attempts, in 1819
and 1826, to establish a constitution. They were not successful, mainly, because they
did not reflect the shared aspirations of majoritarian sectors of the social structure.
See, e.g., ALBERTO GARCIA LEMA, LA REFORMA POR DENTRO: LA DIFICIL
CONSTRUCCION DEL CONSENSO CONSTITUCIONAL 24 (Planeta, Buenos Aires 1994).
60. See Bruce Ackerman & Carlos Rosenkrantz, Tres Concepciones de la
Democracia Constitucional, 29 CUADERNOS Y DEBATES 15, 16 (1991).
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Constitution helped make the transition from dictatorship to
democracy simpler. We just had to sign the "new social contract,"
without having to negotiate what it would contain. The venerable
historic Constitution provided an acceptable framework that people
could subscribe to without much of a discussion. For better or worse,
it had been the symbol to which Argentineans had resorted many
times in the past even in the midst of institutional disruption. Every
time there was discontent with the pending political and institutional
situation, mainly because the power was held by the dictators, the
people appealed to the 1853 Constitution, and asked for a return to
its full observance. When the 1949 Constitution was repealed by the
1955 coup d'etat, the 1853 Constitution was immediately put back in
force. In this way, the original Constitution has been the "political
safety net" that we relied on when our democracy stumbled and fell.
The phenomenon of charisma, usually associated with the
personality of a leader, existed in the very text of the original
Constitution and, thus became a charismatic value in and of itself.
61
There was no charismatic leader to follow: the last one had been
Peron. Alfonsin was not that kind of leader either.62 Instead, much of
the attention was centered on a collection of rules that acquired a
particular magnetism, since many people saw them as the path to the
national reencounter. The 1982 Multipartidaria agreement is a sign of
this peculiar reification of charisma. All political parties in the
agreement - even those that had criticized the 1853 Constitution -
agreed that the historic text should be the rule to recover institutional
normalcy.63
Although quite an old text, which many constituencies would be
happy to see amended, the historic Constitution contained more than
a significant portion of shared values. Its basic tenets could be
accepted by most relevant political sectors in 1983. One should add
that the 1853 Constitution was sort of a "tried-and-true" political tool:
It might not be perfect, but during those periods in which the charter
had been fully observed, the Nation made significant progress." It
61. See VANOSsi, supra note 52, at 43.
62. But see MORALES SOLA, supra note 35, at 344 (arguing that Alfonsin did
possess charismatic resources in a significant degree).
63. See ALBERTO D. LEIVA & EZEQUIEL ABASOLO, CONSTITUCIONALISM
ARGENTINO EN EL SIGLO XX 171 (1998).
64. Of course, the argument could be turned around: the Constitution was
observed because the economic situation and the general context were favorable. As
soon as the world economy collapsed and the context changed, the institutional
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was only after the long series of institutional disruptions that started
in 1930, that the Country had entered into a phase of steady decline,
especially when compared with the development of other comparable
countries on the international scene.
This leads to another factor that might have played a role in
Alfonsin's calculation about the possibilities, and the desirability, of
rushing to embed the "new beginning" in a new constitutional text.
Many people in Argentina had the idea that the problem was not the
constitutional rules themselves but the lack of compliance with
them.65 This idea was taken up and turned into some sort of "official
doctrine" by some political sectors which trivialized the rule of law.
66
Their motto was: "It is not necessary to reform the Constitution, but
only to abide by it." The residual consequences of that ideology may
have contributed to a general climate of resistance to any proposed
change to the constitutional rules. Even in 1988, Jorge Vanossi -who,
besides being a renowned constitutional scholar, was also a member
of the Radical Party and a Representative in House of Deputies-
could describe this "conservative" popular approach to constitutional
reform in the following terms:
[Our] society does not want to move to a completely different
model of state. Such ambition does not correspond to the degree of
aspirations and vital experiences of the current Argentine society.
Our society wants changes; it wants aggiornament, ... it wants
opportunities: yes; but it does not want to make a radical cut with
the great rules of the game... above all, in regard to the underlying
values that ... are perceived here and now as duly adapted and in
disruptions begun. However accurate this explanation may be, it does not alter the
value of my assertions in the main text. It may be a technical explanation, whose
accuracy I doubt, but definitely, it is not the way general public would naturally
perceive the situation. Thus, my contention that the 1853 Constitution was regarded
as a "tried-and-true" political device is not affected. It is a matter of how people
conceived the role of the Constitution in shaping reality, not a matter of to what
extent, if any, it actually did so.
65. The idea is not without foundations, at least partially. Our lack of a serious
culture of abiding by the law hinders the development of any institutional scheme,
however well-designed it may be. Of course, this does not mean that rules do not
play a role in the shaping of society, nor that we should give up all hope and be
skeptics about the ultimate value of the rule of law. For an account of the problem of
"anomie" and "lawlessness" that affect Argentina and the relationship with the lack
of development in potential terms. SeegenerallyCARLOS NINO, UN PAlS AL MARGEN
DE LA LEY (2005).
66. See Humberto Quiroga Lavie, Estudio Introductono, in VANOSSI, supra note
52, at 10.
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force .... 67
There were also additional constraints: during the 1970s, talk of
constitutional reform was rich in references to the "social function of
property,"' which was surely inspired by the 1949 Constitution and,
more broadly, by the so-called 'social constitutionalism' movement
and which engendered the resistance of powerful sectors of society.
69
The prospect of any modification to the already maltreated property
rights of the bourgeoisie was feared like the plague. This concern was
expressed best by the so-called "Article 17-constitutional scholars.,
7
1
As Nino has argued, if at the very beginning of his term Alfonsin
had called for constitutional reform, major political, economic and
social groups would have interpreted the maneuver as highly self-
serving, geared to change the political and economic rules.71 It is very
likely that, in such event, they would have withdrawn their support,
thus frustrating Alfonsin's attempts and, maybe, jeopardizing the
entire process.
An attempt at constitutional reform would have opened the
discussion for a series of different, but similarly disturbing,
67. See VANOSSI, supra note 52, at 47-48.
68. See, e.g., LEIVA & ABASOLO, supra note 63, at 149-53.
69. This seems to be a common constraint in nascent democracies. See
GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN
DEMOCRACIES 69 (1986), cited by MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 17, 18.
70. See VANOSSI, supra note 52, at 46. Article 17 of the 1853 Constitution,
unreformed in 1994, provides that "Property may not be violated, and no inhabitant
of the Nation can be deprived of it except by virtue of a sentence based on law.
Expropriation for reasons of public interest must be authorized by law and previously
compensated. Only Congress levies the taxes mentioned in Article 4. No personal
service can be requested except by virtue of law or sentence based on law. Every
author or inventor is the exclusive owner of his work, invention, or discovery for the
term granted by law. The confiscation of property is hereby abolished forever from
the Argentine Criminal Code. No armed body may make requisitions nor demand
assistance of any kind." Vanossi uses the graphic expression "Article 17
constitutional scholars" to describe a particular sector of Argentina legal academia
that seems to be preoccupied only about the fate of the inviolability of property as a
constitutional guarantee, and that share a primal aversion to "social function of
property," as if it implied necessarily the collectivization of property.
71. SeeNINO, supra note 13, at 129. See also GARCIA LEMA, supra note 59, at 40
(holding that even in 1985, when Alfonsin made the first moves pushing
constitutional reform to the center of debate, public opinion saw the attempt as
pursuing a hidden motive - probably associated with allowing Alfonsin's reelection,
something the 1853 Constitution did not provide for).
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possibilities: some Peronistsn wanted to re-establish the 1949 Peronist
Constitution - that had been repealed illegally, though the legality of
its very enactment is itself disputable 73 - while others, such as the
previously pro-reform Luder,74 simply opposed the idea because of
their unwillingness to let another party leave its mark on the
constitutional realm.75 Moreover, military sympathizers might have
decided to pursue an authoritarian constitutional path had they been
given the chance.
One should not forget that the Military had started its political
adventure with high ambitions: to reorganize the Nation, to change its
economic structures, to restructure its basic institutions, and to
reformulate the basic values contained in the Preamble to the
Constitution.76 The dictatorship had envisioned itself as the great
transformer of Argentina.77 The generals' plan was not unlike a
political party's plan; it was the military party's plan. A "military
Constitution" was only the natural culmination of such a political
scheme.
There were, it seems clear, too many conflicting aspirations
about what should be accomplished through constitutional reform,
had the chance to reform the Constitution actually been taken. Thus,
the return to the 1853 Constitution was a simple way to rule out the
possibility of any disputes over the constitutional framework of the
newly reinstated democracy. Strategically, it allowed Alfonsin to
72. Particularly, a sector or the party, led by his president Vicente L. Saadi, who
would even present a bill to the effect in 1986. See GARCIA LEMA, supra note 59, at
46. See also LEIVA & ABASOLO, supra note 63, at 173.
73. Peronists failed to secure the necessary majority of two-thirds of the total
members of both Cameras for the legality of the bill authorizing the reform and the
election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Instead, they counted two-
thirds of the members present at the moment of voting, and went along with the
reform. Radicals (UCR) protested, but then, inconsistently took part in the election
and took their seats in the Convention. See, e.g., Lucretia Illsley, The Argentine
Constitutional Revision of 1949, 14:2 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 224,227 (1952).
74. See ITALO LUDER, EL PROCESO ARGENTINO 104-39 (Ediciones Corregidor,
Buenos Aires 1977) (arguing that the political crisis could not be solved by a mere
reform of the Constitution; it was necessary to enact a new Constitution that
embodied a new national project).
75. See MORALES SOLA, supra note 35, at 80.
76. See FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 12, at 240.
77. See SKAAR, supra note 13, at 67, n.4. See also MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at
86; LEIVA & ABASOLO, supra note 63, at 165 (recalling that in 1977, the military
drafted a "National Project" that expressed the wish of effectuating deep changes in
the 1853 Constitution's power scheme).
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eschew the disquieting possibility of a Peronist Constitution or, even
worse, an authoritarian influenced text that could be ushered in under
the auspices of the Peronist party's military constituency.
Additionally, it must be borne in mind that Alfonsin was keen on the
idea of moving towards a semi-parliamentary system, an idea that
would later generate resistance in some sectors of his own party,8 but
mainly in the Peronist Party, which prescribed to the idea of
"presidentialism," even if admitting for the possibility of some
mitigating elements, such as the figure of a Chief of Cabinet of
Ministers with responsibilities over the administration of the
country.79
Due to all these conflicting positions, as well as to links the
military retained in certain sectors of the civilian population, it may
have been that, for Argentina, new constitutional lawmaking,
contrary to Ackerman's theory, would have been a divisive instead of
unifying factor.
Moreover, old constitutions, because they are detached from
current political fights, often have a halo of political purity that makes
them more attractive for people in general. As long as the text
reasonably reflects society's basic commitments of the day, even if the
text does not encompass all of them, it may well be that a traditional
Constitution plays a reassuring role in time of transition.
Much in the same way, this "political purity" accounts for the
movement from particularized synthesis to comprehensive synthesis
in judicial interpretation;' ° the slow but inevitable passing of time
induces the people to think of their historical Constitution in more
charitable terms. Take, for instance, the case of pre-existing
constitutional pacts that led to the formation of the Argentina
Republic. The Preamble expressly refers to them.8' Nowadays,
78. See Ricardo Gil Lavedra, Prologo, in GARCIA LEMA, supra note 59, at 12.
79. See GARCIA LEMA, supra note 59, at 57. This tendency, although in a much
watered-down version, would find its way into the Constitutional text in 1994.
80. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE FOUNDATIONS 96-99 (1991).
Particularized synthesis treats constitutional principles at a very low level of
abstraction, paying close attention to the historical circumstances that surrounded the
enactment of the texts to be interpreted and, perhaps even to the concrete intentions
of the legislators in regard to the issue at hand. Contrarily, comprehensive synthesis
heightens the level of abstraction and generality at which the principles are
interpreted. The concrete intentions of the lawgiver tend to go out of the center of
the stage, displaced by a focus on the more abstract principles that can be plausibly
read into the texts.
81. "We, the representatives of the people of the Argentine Nation, gathered in
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nobody thinks about them in terms of dubious political bargains
between caudillos whose commitment to legality was hard to
ascertain. Such pacts are usually regarded as, more or less aseptic
fundamental steps in the constitutional construction of the country.
However, the Pacto de Olivos executed by President Carlos Menem
and his predecessor Raul Alfonsin, which paved the way for the 1994
Constitutional Convention, is commonly thought of as a rather
spurious exchange of presidential nominations for two seats on the
Supreme Court.82 As time passes, the concrete details of the bargain
as well as the motivations of the actors will slowly fade from the
collective memory, but the sounder principles of the pact will remain.
In the future, the Pacto de Olivos will probably be considered in its
own right as one of the pre-existing pacts that gave life (in this case,
simply a partially new form) to the Argentine Republic.
Consequently, prima facie, it might have made some sense to use the
historic Constitution as the legal and political base for the new
beginning, even if the ultimate intention was to reform it in the not
so-distant future.
There is yet another factor that heavily influenced Alfonsin's
decision to offer the people the historic Constitution: the long-
promised military trials. Before winning the election, Alfonsin had
decided to embark on an ambitious plan of corrective justice.
Violators of human rights were to be held accountable and neither
the subversive guerrilla nor the military would go unpunished. As
Ackerman points out, both constitutional lawmaking and corrective
justice are attempts to draw a sharp legal line between the old order
and the new regime.83 Perhaps this was Alfonsin's method of drawing
that line.
However, corrective justice and constitutional reform are not
interchangeable as they do have important differences: corrective
justice looks back, striving to right the wrongs from the past, while
constitutionalism looks forward, seeking to shape the future so that
the past cannot be repeated; corrective justice focuses on particular
individuals, while constitutionalism involves institutions and general
General Contituent Assembly, by will and election of the Provinces which compose
it, in fulfillment ofpre-existing pacts. . ." CONST. ARG. PREAMBLE (emphasis added).
82. Although Alfonsin would only get one, eventually, since Menem did not fully
comply with their "gentlemen's agreement" regarding the Court seats, and the UCR
only got the appointment of Justice Bossert.
83. See ACKERMAN, supra note 54, at 70.
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principles; corrective justice tend to generate divisions among the
population, while constitutional lawmaking attempts to unite the
People in defining a new order.84 There seems to be some degree of
incompatibility between the approaches, and it would seem that the
forward-looking task of constitutional building is more promising for
countries facing "new beginning" type situations and a past of grave
human rights violations.
This tension may help explain why Alfonsin could not achieve
constitutional reform: he made the wrong decision. But is this really
so? Had the circumstances been different, could he have gone the
other way and tried to 'constitutionalize' the spirit of renascent
democracy without pursuing any degree of corrective justice? Could
Alfonsin have followed both paths: constitutional reform and military
trials, or did he just blunder in what was probably the most important
decision of his term?
Not necessarily. Alfonsin in fact did not have the option to
abandon the promise of corrective justice. He had promised time and
time again that criminals would have to face civilian justice. It had
been a central theme of the electoral process, and one of his main
differences from his opponents in the election.85 Of course, this would
not be the first time that a politician disappointed his constituency.
But this was different; this promise was central to the "new
beginning." The people had put him in the Casa Rosada with a
mandate to reestablish the rule of law"' and this task, almost logically,
required that at least the main actors of the terror of the 1970s were
held accountable. 87
Second, and for the same reasons, the option of blanket amnesty
84. Id at 70-71.
85. The surprising victory of Alfonsin, along with his heavy campaigning on
uncompromising retribution, is credited by Aguero as the decisive factor why
Argentina was a case of "no-compromise transition." See Felipe Aguero, Legacies of
Transitions: Institutionalization, The Military, and Democracy in South America, 42
MERSHON INT'L STUDIES REV. 383, 390 (1998).
86. In the same train of thought, see Crawford, supra note 51, at 20, n.14
(arguing that the mandate to re-establish the rule of law implied that the fate of
"desaparecidos" - disappeared people - had to be faced).
87. But see Emilio Mignone, Cyntia Estlund and Samuel Issacharoff,
Dictatorship On Trial Prosecution of Human Rights Violations in Argentina, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 118, 149 (1984) (arguing that the three-levels scheme devised by
Alfonsin would fail to reinforce the rule of law; only complete punishment would, in
their view, achieve such goal).
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was not feasible." This is so not only because it could be argued, as
Malamud Goti, Nino and others have done,89 that the ideal of
democracy would suffer if the military criminals were not prosecuted,
but also because it would be very difficult to gain credibility for the
rule of law without the trials. Why should people believe that 'this
time would be different' and that the Constitution, old or new, would
be respected if the Alfonsin administration failed to bring to justice
these undisputed violatiors of the rule of law? The Constitution
would be nothing more than a sheet of paper. Why should
Argentineans have reasons to believe that the hypothetical new
Constitutional text would be the embodiment of their collective
achievement as a free people and not merely "that little notebook,"
as former dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas scornfully referred to
constitutions? 90
This point is of the utmost importance, and may assist the
understanding of Alfonsin's fateful decision to pursue corrective
justice instead of a new Constitution. As previously noted, Alfonsin
did want a new Constitution. Alfonsin believed in the possibility of
shaping politics through institutions and above all, he believed in the
foundational character of his administration. 9' But he was aware of
both the political and legal necessity of the trials. Any attempt to
88. See Alejandro Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina:
Partial Failure or Qualified Success 9, 31 COLUM. J. TRANST'L L. 3, 12 (1993-1994).
89. See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why
Punish State Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTs. 0. 1, 3 (1990). See generally NINO, supra
note 13; and MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 8.
90. Letter from Juan Manuel de Rosas to Estanislao Lopez, in PAPELES DE
ROSAS (Ed. by Felix Barreto), citation by Jose Maria Rosa, "Las Diez Noches
Historicas," 1 Revista del Instituto Juan Manuel de Rosas (July/Sept. 1944); available
at <http://www.pensamientonacional.com.arfbiblioteca-j osemariarosa/Articulos/
dieznocheshistoricas.htm> (visited Dec. 7, 2006). See also Jorge Vanossi,
Suplemento (1) al Orden del Dia Nro 929, Cdmara de Diputados de la Naci6n:
Sesiones Ordinarias, available at <http://www.diputados.gov.ar/dependencias/
dcomisiones/periodo-124/124-929-s.pdf> (visited Dec. 7, 2006); Sandra Olaza Pallero,
Respeto Rosas los Derechos ExistencialesZ REVISTA ELECTRONICA DE DERECHOS
EXISTENCIALES, available at <http://www.revistapersona.com.ar/olaza.htm> (visited
Dec. 7, 2006).
91. In his Inaugural Speech to the Legislative Assembly, on Dec. 10, 1983,
Alfonsin explicitly acknowledged that it was the notion of being protagonists of this
"new beginning," which would be definitive, inspired in the people a feeling of
responsibility, equal to the effort that would be undertaken. See Mensaje
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establish a new constitutional order, without making the effort
credible by fulfilling electoral promises and holding the dictators
responsible, would probably have been deemed less legitimate.
So the military trials acquired a two-tier priority: political and
legal. In Alfonsin's plan, bringing the "Dirty War" criminals to
justice became a logical priority. Once the issue had been dealt with,
if successful, Alfonsin would have even more support from the masses
as the democratic hero that effectively achieved justice in a very
difficult time. At the same time, the promise of strict compliance with
the rule of law would appear manifest. Thus, the scene would be
ready for the triumphant entrance of a new, parliamentary-oriented
Constitution.
It was a risky gamble; and eventually, it failed. Alfonsin could
barely manage the constant military demands, and he failed in the
economic arena as well. But the risk he took could have had big
payoffs had the process not been hampered by a number of factors
(e.g., military pressures, lapse of time92 and an unmanageable
economic crisis). Alfonsin may have underestimated the obstacles he
would have to face in order for corrective justice to succeed as he had
envisioned. But he was not completely wrong in his assessment of
how to establish a credible and enduring new constitutional order.
The trials had value as expressions of the "new beginning."
Alfonsin's previous decision to postpone the drafting of a new
constitutional text put even more pressure in the direction of
corrective justice. The symbol of the foundational stage in the
republic would have to be played out, at least temporarily, by the
Courts.
The return of democracy in 1983 had implied the restoration of
constitutional legality. Legitimacy, however, was something that had
to be built by the new democratic government. This uphill task
required the complete rejection of the civilian and military
authoritarian past, as well as the reclamation of the rule of law in a
pluralist constitutional democracy.93 The military trials also played an
important role as a symbol of this ideological commitment. The act
of bringing the most conspicuous criminals of the recent past to
civilian justice was a sharp break with the authoritarian past in two
92. As Malamud-Goti has stated, time was crucial to the task of bringing the
military dictators, as well as some of the most notorious perpetrators, to justice. See
Malamud-Goti, supra note 89, at 4.
93. See FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 12, at 267.
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different ways. First, as McSherry argues, it channeled society's
explicit rejection of the military's National Security State.94 On a more
concrete, procedural level, it also signaled a clear break with past
practices of on-the-spot, summary, and informal "justice" that had
been deployed by the dictatorship and the guerrilla. The fact that
guerrilla leaders would also be brought to justice must not be
overlooked: Argentina had had more than its fair share of violence,
and it was ready to reject the concept altogether.
Perhaps the most remarkable expression of the deep meaning
the trials had in the context of the "new beginning" was Prosecutor
Strassera final plea before the Federal Court of Appeals:
We, Argentineans, have tried to achieve peace based on forgetting,
and we failed: I have already spoken about past and unsuccessful
amnesties. We have attempted to search peace through violence
and extermination of the adversary ... From this trial on ... we
have the responsibility to look for a peace based not on forgetting
but on memory; not on violence, but on justice. This is our
opportunity: it may be the last one ... I want to renounce to any
claim of originality.. .I want to use a phrase that does not belong to
me, because it belongs to the entire Argentine People ... NEVER
AGAIN.
95
That "NEVER AGAIN" summarized in two words, the meaning
of a thousand: the clear break from the violent past Argentine people
had longed for.
C. The Failure of Alfonsin's Strategy for Human Rights and Its
Effects on the Legitimacy of the Constitutional Process
Alfonsin's strategy was relatively successful until September 18,
1985. I cannot elaborate here in full detail the complex sequence of
facts that eventually led to this failure. 96  Suffice it to say that
Alfonsin's original strategy contemplated limited punishment, since
he was aware of the constraints imposed both by time and military
resistance. He established three different categories of responsibility:
1) those who organized the state apparatus of terror and gave the
94. See MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 126.
95. See Julio Cesar Strassera, Fundar Una Paz Basada en ]a Memoria y en ]a
Justicia, in LUCIANO DE PRIVTELLIO & Luis ALBERTO ROMERO, GRANDES
DISCURSOS DE LA HISTORIA ARGENTINA 409 (2000).
96. For more detailed explanations, see NINO, supra note 13, at 41-134; see also
Malamud-Goti, supra note 89, at 4-5; MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 120-235.
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orders; 2) those who, following orders or not, committed atrocious
acts; and 3) those who, in a general climate of confusion and
oppression, followed orders and committed offenses which did not
constitute atrocities."' He had announced this policy long before the
1983 election,98 and on October 26, a few days before the election, he
spoke before nearly one million people, emphasizing the need for
justice and his plan for these three categories of criminal liability."
Shortly thereafter, he won by a landslide.
One could speculate that Alfonsin received the popular mandate
to rebuild democracy and to carry on the proposed strategy to deal
with human rights violators. Seemingly, the support continued during
the trials, given that in the 1985 legislative election the UCR
(Alfonsin's party) roughly maintained the same proportion of the
votes as in 1983.1° At any rate, it was clear that the people did not see
any significant problem in the government's human rights plan. °1
However, the plan did have some flaws: For instance, although
theoretically it did differentiate between those who had committed
atrocities and those who had simply followed orders, as a practical
matter it was very difficult to delineate the two categories. All of the
crimes committed to further illegal repression amounted to violations
of human rights that could be considered "atrocious."
Despite the efforts of the government to deploy its initial
strategy and bring a relative degree of tranquility to both the lower-
rank officials and the general public, military discomfort began to
surface. Initially, Alfonsin proposed a bill that created a presumption
of coerced action and, thus, provided a due obedience justification in
97. See Carlos S. Nino, The Human Rights Policy of the Argentine
Constitutional Government.- A Reply, 11 YALE J. INT'L. L. 217,222 (1985-1986).
98. See id.
99. SeeNINO, supra note 13, at 66.
100. In 1985, the UCR obtained 42 percent of the total votes for the Lower
House, against 34 percent of the Peronist party, the main opposition at the time,
while for the Senate the UCR got seventeen seats whereas the Peronists got twenty-
two; in 1983, the UCR had collected 46 percent (Lower House) against 37 percent of
the Peronist Party, while in the Senate, the UCR had won eighteen seats, versus
twenty-two of the Peronists rivals. The proportions show little variance. See Base de
Datos Politicos de las Americas (1999), Argentina: Elecciones Legislativas de 1983,
Georgetown University y Organizaci6n de Estados Americanos, available at
<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Arg/cong83.html> (visited Nov. 13, 2006).
101. Of course, this does not mean - and it could not mean - that nobody had any
objections to the plan. Instead, it means that a significant majority of the public
supported Alfonsin's attempt at transitional justice, limited and imperfect as it was
from the beginning.
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favor of all lower-rank officials who lacked decision-making power.' °2
However, Congress substituted the words "it may be presumed" for
"it will be presumed," making the presumption rebuttable.
10 3
Conceivably, the presumption could be rebutted in many
circumstances. As pressure from the military mounted, there were
fears of institutional disruption."l This was just one problem that
Alfonsin would face in moving forward with his original plan.
After the successful conviction of the main military leaders,
perhaps the most momentous episode in Alfonsin's term, the stability
of Alfonsin's vision deteriorated. Before the 1985 legislative
elections, there were rumors of amnesty; however, these rumors were
denied by the Interior Minister Antonio Troccoli
105
Nonetheless, tension between Alfonsin's cabinet and his
constituents mounted. The administration's tactic of making
concessions to every military demand was counterproductive as they
merely encouraged additional requests for favorable treatment.'06
Finally, the administration began to entertain the idea that the
military trials should be stopped in the hope of regaining full
control.t0 7
Some people in the administration hoped that the Courts would
solve the problem by defining Due Obedience in terms that would be
helpful to the large mass of lower-rank officials that constituted
Alfonsin's problem. Lower court judges were reluctant to do so. The
Supreme Court was also expected to deal with the issue,'O° but it
similarly declined because the Justices rightly considered that the
topic bore no substantial relationship with the cases to be decided
102. NINO, supra note 13, at 71, 75.
103. Id. at 75.
104. Id. at 77, 84, 86, 93, 111 (describing the process by which military unrest and
pressures mounted throughout the period 1984-1987, and the generalized fear among
politicians that the situation could degenerate, if not into a direct coup d'etat, at least
into pressures for a participation of the military in the conduction of the country).
105. See MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 207.
106. Id. at 227.
107. See NINO, supra note 13, at 90 (giving his personal impression, as a close
advisor to President Alfonsin and an attendee of secret meetings at very high level,
that the idea of stopping the trials was gaining ground by March 1986).
108. It seems to me an irony that elective branches often complain when judges,
by means of exercising judicial review of legislation, intervene in economic matters.
Those are deemed "political," no matter how encroaching of individual rights the
economic measures may be. However, when faced with a properly "political
question," i.e., grant an amnesty to repressors, politicians frequently prefer to shift
the burden to the Judiciary.
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(these involved high-ranked military leaders, who could not claim to
have obeyed any orders)." Additionally, the Court thought that it
was the task of the elected branches of government to find a political
solution to the problem."'
By the end of 1986, Congress had successfully passed Law No.
23.492 (commonly known as Punto Final ["Full Stop"]), which set a
time limit of sixty days for the indictment of all military officials who
had committed crimes during the dictatorship."' Instead of
functioning as an extremely short statute of limitations, designed to
preclude prosecution, the law sparked a frenzy of judicial activity.
Hundreds of officers received citations. The courts suspended their
summer holidays to be able to process all the files before the period
set by the law expired. Again, the administration's plan had misfired.
By the spring of 1987, the new democracy was at risk again.
Following the resistance of Colonel Barreiro to appear before the
Federal Court of Appeals in Cordoba, Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico
rebelled in Campo de Mayo." 2 The loyal forces were in a difficult
position due to the reluctance of various squadrons to repress Rico.
The level of tension was high. The people mobilized in defense of
democracy, surrounding the garrison where Rico and the rebels were,
and later demonstrating in Plaza de Mayo and all over the country.
Finally, Alfonsin flew to Campo de Mayo and negotiated the
surrender of the rebels. It was more than obvious that the problem of
the military's resistance needed an urgent solution.
Alfonsin and his closest legal and political advisors analyzed a
few different options."3 Both an amnesty and presidential pardons
presented serious constitutional and political problems. Amnesty
would result in a benefit to all those responsible for a crime.
According to Article 18 of the Constitution, which prohibits the
application of ex post facto criminal laws, such requirement,
established in the Military Code, article 478, could not be abrogated
for the occasion. Hence, any amnesty would free all military
109. See NINO, supra note 13, at 100.
110. See id
111. Law No. 23493 art. 1, Dec. 24, 1986, available at
<http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/20000-24999/21864/norma.htm>
(visited Mar. 23, 2008).
112. For a full account of the rebellion, see NINO, supra note 13, at 95-100.
113. See id.
114. Article 18 of the Constitution, in its relevant part, prescribes: "No inhabitant
of the Nation may be punished without previous trial based on a law enacted before
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personnel, even the commanders who had been already convicted.
Pardons were not a feasible option either since pardons could not be
granted to persons not yet convicted."5
Some have suggested that there was yet another option available:
to grant prosecutors discretion to chose whom to put on trial." 6 It was
hoped that they would drop charges in most cases, focusing only on
the most conspicuous perpetrators. In this way, military unrest would
cease, while the most important and symbolic prosecutions could still
be carried out consistent with the democratic process. Carlos Nino
was a proponent of this idea and Alfonsin seemed enthusiastic about
it as well."7 However, Alfonsin faced opposition from the Attorney
General, Juan Gauna, and others who thought the proposal would
appear to be an adhocsolution."8
Finally, Alfonsin decided to send to Congress the "Due
Obedience Bill." The core of its provisions was the irrebuttable
resumptions that lower-ranked officials [had] acted following orders
and, thus, were not punishable. The presumption also covered
superior officers if they did not act as chiefs of zones, sub-zones, or of
armed, security, and prison forces." 9 This presumption could be
rebutted if shown that they had had decision-making power, or had
helped to formulate orders. The Due Obedience Bill suppressed the
the act that gives rise to the process, nor tried by special committees, nor removed
from the judges appointed by law before the act for which he is tried." On top of that,
the best constitutional interpretation also requires an amnesty to be general and,
thus, to reach those already convicted. Article 75, incise 20, establishes as a power of
Congress "to grant generalamnesties" (emphasis added) (translated by the author).
115. Such was, arguably, the best constitutional interpretation, but clearly not the
only possible one. Menem, for instance, didn't follow it. Of course, Menem was no
legalist and had not much appreciation for the rule of law. He believed in caudillo
style of leadership.
116. See Andrew S. Brown, Adios Amnesty: Prosecutorial Discretion and
Military Trials in Argentina, 37 TEX. INT'L. L. J. 203, 217 (2002) (suggesting that such
method could be adequate in Argentina's current situation, after the judicial
nullification of the "amnesty laws" of Full Stop Law and Due Obedience Law).
117. See NINO, supra note 13, at 100.
118. See id The argument, which Nino finds somewhat persuasive, does not hold:
any solution at that point would look adlhoc. Perhaps the opposition of the Attorney
General Juan Gauna and the prosecutors was based in different concerns: why should
they appear before society as the ones who decided who would be prosecuted and
who would not? It would have been a very undesirable situation for Gauna and his
staff. Just as the justices thought, the Attorney General may have thought that if it
was a political issue, he should not be the one charged with making the hard
decisions.
119. Law No. 23521, June 8 1987, [XLIV-A] A.L.J.A. 260.
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exception that Congress had introduced to the Executive bill,
modifying the Military Code on the issue of Due Obedience.
Nonetheless, this bill had a loophole that permitted prosecution for
specific crimes namely, rape, kidnapping and concealment of
children, and appropriation of real property. Ultimately, the law was
aimed at limiting corrective justice to the upper military echelon. In
that regard, the law was successful; finally, Alfonsin had achieved the
political feat that he long desired.
However, many people were not so pleased with this trade-off
between justice and stability, which Alfonsin claimed saved
Argentina's fledgling democracy.2 ° Enacted only a month after the
Easter rebellion, the new law was seen as a concession in favor of the
military and a detriment to the democratic government. 2' Bitter
criticism and indignation were expressed by large sectors of society
and there was much opposition and outrage. 2  The legislative
election of 1987, held only months after the enactment of the Due
Obedience Law, punished Alfonsin and the UCR with big losses, and
resulted in corresponding Peronist victories.23
Even if Alfonsin had tried to accomplish something similar to the
Due Obedience Law with the bill he sent to Congress a couple of
120. Former President Raul Alfonsin does not hesitate to say that his much-
criticized measures saved democracy. See, e.g., Entrevista a RaulAlfonsin, Diario La
Capital, (Apr. 30, 2006), available at <http://www.asteriscos.tv/noticia-155.html>
(visited Feb. 17, 2008) and "Yo salv6 ]a democracia con la ley de punto final," dijo
Alfonsfn, DIARIo Hoy, available at <http://www.diariohoy.net/notas/verNoticia.
phtml/html/227319/?1024 > (visited Feb. 17, 2008).
121. See NINO, supra note 13, at 101; see also Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN],
14/06/2005, "Simon, Julio Hector y otros," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (2005-328-2056) (Zaffaroni, J., concurring)
(acknowledging that the Executive and Congress were faced with a delicate situation
when the Due Obedience and Full Stop laws were passed).
122. See, e.g., MCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 217; NINO, supra note 13, at 101;
SKAAR, supra note 13, at 115-16.
123. It is difficult to tell, however, how much influence in the legislative electoral
losses should be attributed to the handling of the military situation and how much to
the economic crisis. Also, it must be taken into account that the variation in
percentage, of UCR votes, while significant, it is by no means absolutely conclusive:
in 1985, the UCR carried 42 percent of the votes for Deputies, and Peronism, 34
percent; in 1987, Peronism totaled 40 percent, while UCR reached 37 percent. See
Base de Datos Polfticos de las Am6ricas, supra note 100. The real magnitude of the
loss becomes apparent when the provinces' election for governors is computed:
seventeen out of twenty-two provinces went to the Peronist Party, with 3 being taken
by provincial parties, and only two (plus the federal district) going to the Radical
Party.
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years before, the new law was something different. The persistent
military pressure hinted at the emergence of a "guardian democracy."
Thus, popular rejection and opposition to the law was more intense
that it would have been, had the process not involved a rebellion. It
could also be argued that Alfonsin failed to fulfill his electoral
promise - foundational in character - that those who committed
atrocious crimes would be punished. That was the deal between
Alfonsin and his constituency. Something was lost in 1987 in terms of
the general legitimacy of the transitional justice.
Shortly after being inaugurated as President, Carlos Saul Menem
took up the task of destroying whatever positive effects the Alfonsin
experiment had had. Between October 1989 and December 1990,
Menem pardoned both the Montoneros guerrilla people and the
military officers that were either convicted or awaiting trial.' The
first set of pardons reached 400 people that were on trial. It is
doubtful that such measures were constitutional."' They were not the
functional equivalent of pardons, and these presidential decrees
interfered with the judiciary, in open violation of the separation of
powers established by our Constitution.126 In 1990, Menem completed
the dismantling of the corrective justice enterprise in which Argentine
People had invested almost a decade: He pardoned the commanders
that had been convicted in the "big trial." The largest symbol of
Argentina's effort to break with its troublesome past was gone, and
with it, much of the legitimacy of the "new beginning." In some ways,
Menem's actions implied a return to the pre-1983 state of affairs. Of
124. See NINO, supra note 13, at 104; see also Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN],
19/8/1999, "Fayt, Carlos Santiago v. Estado Nacional," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de
la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1999-322-1408) (Arg.) (Fayt, J.,
dissenting).
125. See NINO, supra note 13, at 103. See also MIGUEL A. EKMEKDJIAN, 5
TRATADO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 114 (Depalma, Buenos Aires 1999). But
the Supreme Court, which had been increased from five to nine seats in 1990 by
Menem, decided otherwise in "Aquino," by a five-to-two vote (only seven justices
took part in the consideration of the case). Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN],
14/10/1992, "Aquino," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de
la Naci6n [Fallos] (1992-315-2421)[0] (Arg.). It must be noted that, contrary to what
one might guess, two of the justices appointed by Alfonsin voted to uphold the
presidential power to pardon persons under trial and one dissented. Of course, it is
impossible to know what would have happened had the number of seats on the Court
not been increased in 1990.
126. Article 109 of the Constitution provides that "In no case, the President of the
Nation shall exercise judicial functions, assume jurisdiction over pending cases, or
reopen those already adjudged." CONST. ARG. ART. 109.
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course, certain achievements in the political culture went much
deeper and could not be uprooted by the executive pardons; the
rejection of military authoritarianism was definitive. However,
paradoxically, Argentina quickly accustomed itself to civilian leaders
with authoritarian tendencies.
The failure of corrective justice, while not complete, was
certainly substantial. After 1990, the symbolic system that had
embodied the "new beginning" in 1983 had been dismantled. An
important degree of legitimacy - not of the entire democratic process,
but of one of the methods Alfonsin had chosen to signal the new
foundation of Argentina's democracy - had been lost.
D. The Role of the Supreme Court After 1983 and the Camps
Case
The behavior of the Supreme Court during the 1983-1990 term
confirms that the 1983 election, and the reestablishment of the 1853
Constitution, were in fact a "new beginning." Throughout this period,
the Court acted consistently with Ackerman's prediction of
"redemptive" judicial review.'27 Although there was actually no
"new" constitutional text in the full sense of the word, the 1853 legal
structure was renewed: The Constitution's great principles had not
been observed for a long time and so the force of Alfonsin's promise
was an open invitation for the Court to redeem these commitments.
In Sejeanlu for instance, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional the 1893 civil law provision that forbade divorced
people from reacquiring nuptial ability.2 9 It did so, by adopting a
dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation, ruling on the
ground of the principle of individual autonomy, which the Court
extracted from Article 19 of the Constitution. In Portillo,13 again by
the same three-to-two bare majority of Sejean, the Court
acknowledged the right of a conscientious objector to comply with
127. See Ackerman, supra note 18, at 795.
128. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 27/12/1986, "Sejean, Juan Bautista v. Ana
Maria Zaks de Sejean," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia
de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1986-308-2268) (Arg.) (The case was decided by a three-to-two
majority formed by Justices Fayt, Petracchi and Bacque).
129. Id.
130. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 18/4/1989, "Portillo, Alfredo," Colecci6n
Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1989-312-496)
(Arg.).
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conscription without the use of weapons. In Bazterrica,"' it ruled
unconstitutional the criminalization of the possession of drugs for
personal consumption in quantities inadequate for the purposes of
sale and distribution. Again, the constitutional ground was the
principle of privacy and autonomy established by Article 19. In the
Repetto case,'32 the Justices held unconstitutional the requirement of
nationality for a career in pedagogy because it deprived foreigners of
the equal exercise to civil rights acknowledged by Article 20 of the
Constitution. In Arenzon,'33 the Court declared an administrative
resolution that required teachers to be of a minimum height of 160
centimeters clearly arbitrary and an encroachment on individual
rights. The concurring opinion of Justices Belluscio and Petracchi is
particularly descriptive of the function the Court was willing to
assume:
... [t]hat it is also true that the State has a compelling interest in
education. Therefore, it is valid to wonder whether the exigency of
an oath of loyalty to the Constitution -instead of the one meter and
sixty centimeters requirement- that included the explicit
compromise to repudiate, from the teacher position, the
promotion.., of any idea or act leading to the inobservance of its
[the Constitution's] fundamental principles and guarantees, is not
more compatible with the State's democratic structure. In the end,
nobody is taller than the Constitution itself ... 15) That it is not
necessary to possess an elaborate understanding of the issue to
notice the principles of an elitist, perfectionist, and authoritarian
ethic that give ideological support to the impeached rule ... 17).
That neither may this Court prescind of the fact that the obstacle
has been established by de facto authorities, which demands a deep
and punctiliousjudicial scrutiny False" 134
The rejection of the authoritarian past, in all its possible forms -
from culture to legal rules - is present in this concurrence. With
131. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 29/8/1986, "Bazterrica, Gustavo Mario y
Capalbo, Alejandro Carlos" Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1986-308-1392) (Arg.).
132. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 08/11/1988, "Repetto, Maria Ines v.
Provincia de Buenos Aires," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1988-311-2272) (Arg.).
133. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 15/5/1985, "Arenzon, Gabriel Dario v.
Estado Nacional Argentino," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1984-306-400) (Arg.) (emphasis added). The Court
was unanimous in this case.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
2008]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
regard to the validity of de facto rules, the Court took a clear stance
in Aramayd35 and Dufourq,'36 declaring that they are valid only if the
constitutional government acknowledges such validity, explicitly or
implicitly.
Of course, these are but a few of the many important cases the
Supreme Court decided in the 1983-1989 period. But they suffice as a
small example of the general tendency of the Court during those
years.'37 The justices were taking seriously the job of stating "broad
constitutional principles [] to vindicate them in ways that ordinary
men and women will appreciate.'
13 8
The constitutional validity of the Due Obedience and Full-Stop
Laws received a different, more cautious approach from the Court.
Redemptive courts sometimes do appreciate the virtues of
prudence.39  The Camp' 40  case was, precisely, one of those
opportunities. In a divided opinion, 4' the Supreme Court upheld the
Due Obedience Law - as it would do later with the Full-Stop Law -,
135. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/2/1984, "Aramayo, Domingo Raul,"
Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos]
(1984-306-72) (Arg.).[O]
136. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 27/3/1984, "Dufourq, Felix Esteban,"
Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos]
(1984-306-174) (Arg.). Later, the Supreme Court, packed by Menem's political allies,
would return to a doctrine much more benevolent towards de facto rules.
137. See, e.g., Roberto Gargarella, In Search of Democratic Justice - What
Courts Should Not Do: Argentina, 1983-2002, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE
JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 190
(Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella & Elin Skaar eds., Frank Cass 2004); see also
PELLET LASTRA, HISTORIA POLITICA DE LA CORTE (1930-1990) 412-13 (Ad-Hoc)
(2001); Christopher Larkins, The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina,
30:4 COMP. POLITICS 423, 427 (July 1998) (arguing that during that period the
Judiciary enjoyed notable degrees of impartiality and insularity and possessed fairly
broad authority to regulate the legality of official acts).
138. See Ackerman, supra note 18, at 795.
139. Id.
140. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 22/6/1987 "Camps, Ram6n Juan Alberto
y otros / Causa incoada en virtud del decreto 280/84 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional"
Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos]
(1987-310-1162) (Arg.).
141. The Camps decision was four-to-one. Though, given the arguments
advanced by Justice Petracchi - that turn his reluctant concurrence in almost a
dissenting opinion - the decision could well be regarded as three-and-a-half-to-one-
and-a-half. According to Pellet Lastra, the deliberation among the Justices was
intense, and the decision was delayed due to the lack of a majority. See PELLET
LASTRA, supra note 137, at 433. Unfortunately, there are no personal papers of the
justices that hint what happened inside the Court, what was their disagreement
about, and who was the justice that, ultimately, decided to go along with the majority.
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resorting to different arguments. Justices Fayt and Petracchi
considered that, despite the name of the law and - in the case of
Justice Petracchi - its formal deficiencies, it was an amnesty law that
Congress was competent to enact.1 4 2 Petracchi, whose opinion is for
the most part dissenting,'1 4 '3 held that the country was experiencing
very particular historical and political circumstances, in which the
branches charged with producing norms and those charged with their
interpretation, were all aiming at reestablishing and reaffirming the
democratic and republican government." These goals, in his view,
should guide constitutional hermeneutics.
There was no doubt that the underlying thread in the Court's
opinions - with the sole exception of Justice Bacque's opinions - was
precisely the kind of "prudential-interpretive approach" favored by
Justice Petracchi. The Supreme Court treated the issue as political in
essence. Although the majority did not rely on the "political question
doctrine," it considered that the decision to cease prosecutions was a
legitimate exercise of Congressional authority. Justice Bacque wrote
a powerful dissent to this judgment, and its reasoning must have had a
wide appeal for human rights organizations. The Court's opinion was
a reflection of Argentine society at large: There was no consensus
about the measure, and even those who supported it as a means to
stop military unrest were dissatisfied with it. It is worth noting that all
five Justices had been appointed by Alfonsin; the decision showed
how contested the issue was, even among Alfonsin's constituents.
We can indulge in a brief thought experiment here. What would
have happened if the Supreme Court had ruled the Due Obedience
Law unconstitutional? Given the situation, it would have forced
Alfonsin to take the initiative once again. His options, basically,
would have depended on the arguments used by the Justices.
If the complaints of the hypothetical majority were limited to the
interference with Judiciary (the law left judgments of fact to judicial
discretion) or other similar grounds, then Alfonsin would be left with
the alternative of trying to get Congress to pass an open blanket
amnesty (the worst case scenario from Alfonsin's perspective). Any
142. "Camps," supra note 140, at § 9 (Fayt, J., concurring), § 35 (Petracchi, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Strictly speaking, the law did not provide
for an amnesty with its typical effects. Instead, it created an irrebuttable presumption
of facts for certain categories of officers who did not enjoy decision-making powers.
143. See id. at H8 25-33 (Petracchi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. Seeid. at §§ 34-35, 37-39.
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amnesty would have had to be general, consistent with the accepted
interpretation of the Constitution,145 which would have probably
implied the immediate release of the commanders that had already
been convicted. In the event of general amnesty, Alfonsin's only
clearly successful move, and also the most powerful symbol of the
break with the past and of the reestablishment of the rule of law,
would have been scratched in one go.
Another alternative for Alfonsin would have been the
presidential pardon. This too would have posed some troublesome
questions. The individualized nature of pardons would allow the
convictions of the commanders to stand. But this alternative
presented, at least, three problems: one legal and two political.
Legally, it was doubtful that the president could pardon people on
trial but not yet convicted, as were the majority of the officials.1 '
Politically, it was neither attractive nor completely effective, since, on
the one hand, it put all the political costs of the highly unpopular
decision on Alfonsin's shoulders; while on the other hand it may have
not brought complete tranquility to the military precisely because of
the individualized character of this solution and its dubious
constitutionality. 
147
In the hypothetical of an extremely principled judicial position -
145. Article 75, § 20 of the Constitution explicitly refers to the congressional
power to "grant general amnesties," and scholars have interpreted the requirement
of generality as inherent to amnesties. See, e.g., GERMAN BIDART CAMPOS, 3
MANUAL DE LA CONSTITUCION REFORMADA 126-27 (Ediar, Buenos Aires 1997).
146. But see supra note 123. However, in our hypothetical case, it cannot be
assumed that the Justices that later voted for upholding the presidential power of
pardoning people not-yet-convicted (Justices Petracchi and Fayt) would have voted
in the same way, given the fact that in the example they had been willing to rule
unconstitutional such an important measure as the Due Obedience Law. Nor can it
be assumed that in the five-seat Court of 1987, they would have commanded a
majority, since Justice Belluscio later voted against recognizing such constitutional
power, and Justice Bacque was clearly against the possibility that such offenders
could go unpunished, as he made clear in his dissenting opinion in Camps. The
decisive vote would have been Justice Caballero.
147. The individual nature of the measure implied that for the officers it was
harder to ascertain whether any hypothetical promise would be kept - they were
demanding "a general solution" - and even if Alfonsin complied with the pardoning
scheme, it was not a closed legal question. If Alfonsin decreed pardons immediately,
they would encompass people not-yet-convicted. There was always the possibility of
the Judiciary ruling such pardons unconstitutional even after Alfonsin was out of
office. Of course, Alfonsin could have promised to pardon them after conviction, but
would the rebellious officers have accepted such a deal?
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that crimes of such nature cannot be either amnestied or pardoned'
- would have forced an all-out confrontation with the rebel officers.
The outcome of this confrontation would have depended, ultimately,
on the distribution of forces, and it was unclear whether Alfonsin had
under his command enough loyal forces to crush a large rebellion.'
The Justices had a menu of alternatives to choose from, ranging
from upholding the laws, ruling them unconstitutional on narrow
grounds and thus allowing Alfonsin to proceed with a corrected
version of his measure, to the extremely principled position taken by
Justice Bacque's that such heinous crimes could not be subject to
amnesty. In actuality, the political realities of the time permitted only
two alternatives: the Court could have either supported Alfonsin,
helping him to keep the military under control, or struck down
whatever measures would free the perpetrators of the worst crimes.
There was no sevcrability, or middle ground, available to the Court.
What would have been the point in handing down a minimalist
declaration of unconstitutionality? It would have just escalated the
tension, pushing the situation closer to the brink, without any clear
benefit: Congress and the President could have still released the
officers from responsibility, adjusting their measures to the Court's
demands, which they would have probably done. For the Court, it
would have been something close to political suicide; its authority
would plummet the moment the decision was signed. Additionally,
Alfonsin and Congress would have taken the measure as undue
obstructionism, and the public would have witnessed the decision
take no real effect, due to the likelihood of executive amnesty or
pardons.
The other option was, if the Justices believed that the democratic
148. Of course, since there were no pardons at stake in the Camps case, the Court
did not need to discuss whether such crimes were pardonable. However, some
argumentative lines might have suggested the unconstitutionality of both amnesties
and pardons. This especially includes lines based of international law arguments, as
those used by the current Supreme Court in the Simon case, which will be analyzed
below.
149. See NINO, supra note 13, at 97. Nino explains that Aldo Rico, the leader of
the rebellion in Buenos Aires, had proclaimed that he enjoyed the support of the
commanders of the armed forces in different provinces, and that the loyalist General
Alais had great difficulty in gathering troops to march against Rico's rebellion.
Apparently, the loyalist commander in Campo de Mayo - where Rico was leading
the rebellion - did not have enough troops at his disposal to crush Rico's forces.
Similarly, in Cordoba the Third Army Corps could not force Colonel Barreiro to
submit.
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government could control the rebels, to issue a broad decision
exempting the crimes in question from amnesty and pardon. This
would have been a gamble, and most of the Justices were not ready to
play judicial brinkmanship with democracy at stake.' Clearly, there
were strong political incentives for the Supreme Court to rule as it
did.
E. 1994. A New Constitution and.., the End of a Cycle?
Let us fast-forward a few years later and focus on the actors that
were instrumental in the push for a new constitutional text. Raul
Alfonsin's support for a "pacted" reform assisted in the process by
which Argentina finally underwent a thorough reshaping of its
constitutional charter. After nearly a decade of building up to this
goal, Alfonsin hoped to embed some of his favored ideas in the new
text.'5' The other important character was the acting president, Carlos
Menem, who was seeking to reform the Constitution in order to
enable his reelection on this crest of his popularity due to the relative
success of his economic plan.'52
150. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 22/6/1987 "Camps, Ram6n Juan
Alberto y otros / Causa incoada en virtud del decreto 280/84 del Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional" Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[Fallos] (1987-310-1162) (Arg.), at § 34 (Petracchi, J.) (arguing that despite the grave
constitutional deficiencies of the Due Obedience Law, the Court could not overlook
the fact it demonstrated the will of Congress and the President to quiet social unrest
and, stating that the interpretation of the law cannot disregard either the particular
political circumstances that gave rise to it or the potential consequences of its
invalidation).
151. Many of the institutions suggested by the Alfonsin appointed Council for the
Consolidation of Democracy were in fact incorporated into the 1994 constitutional
text. See generally CONST. ARG. arts. 36 (the right of resistance against de facto
governments), 39-40 (direct and semi-direct means of participatory democracy), 94
(presidential election by direct vote of the citizens), 100 (the Chief Cabinet of
Ministers); cf Law No. 24309, Dec. 31, 1993, [1994-Al A.D.L.A. at 1 (incorporating
the Pacto de Olivos).
152. Menem came to power in 1989, during one of the worst economic crises in
Argentina's history. The state of the economy was central in the political debate.
Menem's 1991 "Convertibility Plan" stabilized the economy and controlled inflation.
This brought him support from sectors of the population that had previously opposed
his administration. As a measure of this success, one can point to his reelection in
1995, with 51 percent of the votes. See CARLOS A. FLORIA & CESAR A.
GARCIA BELSUNCE, HISTORIA DE LOS ARGENTINOS 287-88,
291(Larrouse, Buenos Aires, 2001). For an explanation of the "Convertibility Plan"
and its initial success in controlling inflationary expectations see William C. Smith,
State, Market, and Neoliberalism in Post-Transition Argentinma. The Menem
Expeiment, 33 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 45, 63-64 (1991); Pamela
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A new constitution that would ameliorate the defects of
Argentina's executive-oriented system, "3 had seduced Alfonsin for
many years. Since the mid 1980s, he had entertained the idea of
pushing the political system towards something closer to
parliamentarism. 4 The reformulation of the "supreme law of the
land" would be the perfect tool for this end. Alfonsin had tried to
bring the idea of a constitutional reform to the center of the political
discourse as early as 1985. He created the Council for the
Consolidation of Democracy (Consejo para la Consolidacion de la
Democracia), a presidential commission, consisting of representatives
of different political forces, that was charged with generating
preliminary ideas for the search of a broad consensus on
constitutional reform.5 1 Carlos S. Nino, a renowned scholar and close
advisor to the president, was designated as the Council's coordinator.
The Council produced two important briefs, establishing general lines
for a reform project. Although the political circumstances of the times
prevented the fruition of constitutional reform, many of the Council's
proposals resurfaced as starting points for the Framers of 1994.156
After the initial success of his economic stabilization plan
(referred to as the "Convertibility Plan"), Menem started to push the
idea of allowing presidential re-election. When the Peronist Party
failed to get the necessary votes in the House of Deputies, Menem
ordered a referendum to consult the people about the possibility of a
constitutional reform. Alfonsin, convinced that consensus-based
reform was the better alternative, successfully steered his Party
towards supporting reform.'57 The Pacto de Olivos, signed by Alfonsin
and Menem in 1993 opened the doors for the 1994 Constitutional
K. Starr, Government Coalitions and the Viability of Currency Boards: Argentina
Under the Cavallo Plan, 39 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 83, 85 (1997)
(arguing that the stabilization program had had important political effects, leading to
Menem's reelection in 1995, even in the middle of a recession).
153. For an elaboration of Argentina's hyper-presidential system, see NINO, supra
note 13, at 497-653.
154. See infra note 162, at 49-53.
155. Executive Decree No. 2246/85, B.O. 31/12/1985, p. 1-2.
156. See LEIVA & ABASOLO, supra note 63, at 176.
157. Recently, Alfonsin has held that Menem would have achieved the
constitutional reform even if the Radicals (UCR) opposed it and that the content of
such reform would have been clearly regressive for the Nation, debilitating the
legitimacy of the process and the institutional legality. See ALFONSIN, supra note 50,
at 156.
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Convention.1
8
The Pacto de Olivos worked the following way: there were a
number of issues that formed the core of the proposed revisions, the
so-called "Basic Coincidences Core," and then there were the rest of
the proposals, generically referred to as "Authorized Themes." The
former could not be revised or altered in any way by the Convention
- which could only approve them or reject them as a whole - and the
latter could be discussed, modified, accepted, or rejected by the
delegates. The content of the agreement was enacted under Law No.
24309, which also called for a Constitutional Convention.9 To ensure
that the Convention would not go beyond the limits of the political
consensus that gave rise to its existence, Law No. 24309 expressly
provided that any deviation from the authorized topics would be null
and void (articles 6 and 7, Law No. 24309).' 60
Whatever imperfections may have existed in the chosen process
for reform, there was widespread agreement to carry out the
modifications. Likewise, there was ample debate at the popular level
and the people, in general, had a good understanding of the big
changes that were being discussed.
16
1
In the end, Menem got the revisions he wanted; Alfonsin, in a
somewhat diminished capacity, also had some of his institutional
ideas reflected in the new constitutional text. 62 Many positive
additions were made, and some of the old, anachronistic parts of the
Constitution were revised. The People finally had a new
constitutional text that reflected their long-desired revisions.' 63 At
158. It was signed on December, 14th, 1993. The name "Olivos" is due to the
name of the place where the Presidential Residency is located, and where the
agreement was reached. See CARLOS A. FLORIA & CESAR A. GARCIA BELSUNCE,
HisToR1A DELOSARGENTINOS(Larrouse, Buenos Aires, 2001) at 1051.
159. Law No. 24309, Dec. 31, 1993, [1994-A] A.D.L.A. at 1.
160. Later, the Supreme Court would enforce the limits of the Convention's
reforming powers in Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 19/8/1999, "Carlos Santiago
Fayt v. Estado Nacional," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia
de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1999-322-1408) (Arg.).
161. See Mark P. Jones, Assessing the Public's Understanding of Constitutional
Reform: Evidence from Argentina, 18:1 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 25,42 (Mar. 1996).
162. The purported intention of the reform was to attenuate the presidentialist
features of the system. Many of the ideas that had been discussed in the briefs of the
Council for Consolidation of Democracy were used - if, many times, in a watered-
down version - in the Convention. Compare REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL: SEGUNDO
DICrAMEN DEL CONSEJO PARA LA CONSOLIDACION DE LA DEMOCRACIA (1987), to
the enacted version of the 1994 Constitution.
163. See LEIVA & ABASOLO, supra note 63, at 189.
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least it seemed that legitimacy had been definitely restored and the
1994 revisions would be the end of the constitutional cycle.
What is pertinent to my argument is that the Convention did
succeed in enacting one fundamental reform: Following up on
Alfonsin's efforts to promote a solid human rights policy, the 1994
Framers decided to elevate a number of human rights treaties to
constitutional standing. Article 75, Section 22, of the 1994
Constitution provides that the treaties there enumerated (plus those
which Congress decides at any time by a special procedure stipulated
in the same section) "have constitutional hierarchy, do not repeal any
Section of the First Part of this Constitution, and are to be
understood as complementing the rights and guarantees recognized
herein."
What does this phrase mean and in what position are treaties in
respect to the Constitution itself? Let us see, briefly, what the
Framers thought about the question:
The delegate Barra stated that,
"There is no contradiction, then, between these rights - that we
can call 'new' - and the ones already.., in the dogmatic part of
the Constitution.. .if such a contradiction arises ... there will not
exist the complementariness required ... therefore, such rights will
not be perfected, and thus, it will not be possible to enforce them.
These new rights.., are the culmination of the first 35 articles, and
not their abrogation ... if the legal operator, ultimately the judge,
cannot reach an integrative meaning of the norms in question, the
one mentioned in the dogmatic part of our Constitution will have
primacy.. .in accordance with article 7, Law No. 24309... 64
This was also the position of the majority, and Barra was acting as the
majority speaker.
In general, the dominant position was that treaties were to
preempt federal laws, but that the Constitution would trump
treaties.'65 It was also the case that one of the main conditions under
164. Third Ordinary Session, National Constitutional Convention, Aug. 2, 1994;
full text of debate available at
<http://wwwl.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/Debate%20Constituyente/ago_02-.zip>
(visited Feb. 17, 2008).
165. See generally Gregorio Badeni, El Caso 'Simon' y la Supremacia
Constitucional, reprinted in La Ley [L.L.] (2005-D-639), for a detailed analysis of the
debates in the National Convention, and the argument that several delegates made
the express point that the Constitution should reign over all other normative sources,
even international treaties with "constitutional standing." The delegates were clearly
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which the Convention was called was that it could not modify the
principles, rights, and guarantees contained in the first 35 articles of
the 1853 Constitution. 6 Law No. 24309 explicitly forbade the
Convention to modify in any way such provisions (Article 7), and
provided that any ultra vires action be null and void (Article 6).
Among the relevant constitutional provisions was Article 27,
providing that any honored treaties must be in accordance with "the
principles of public law laid down by this Constitution." The
Supreme Court has consistently held, that the Constitution trumps
treaties, whenever they might conflict with one another. 67
What does all this legalistic analysis have to do with the larger
questions posed in the beginning of this paper? Much, as we will see.
III. A Look at Today
A. The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics: The Simon Case
In 2005, the Supreme Court entered the fray of human rights
politics, handing down a much-anticipated, but nonetheless
controversial, decision in the Simon case. There, by a seven-to-one
vote, the Court reversed itself and overruled the Camps decision.'9
Now, some eighteen years later, the Due Obedience Law and Full-
Stop Law had become unconstitutional.
169
What had happened in those eighteen years? Politically, a lot of
aware of the fact that the Convention was not allowed to modify in any way the first
35 articles of the Constitution.
166. Law No. 24309, supra note 159.
167. In Fibraca, for instance, the Court held that, according to Article 27 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties should be accorded supremacy
over internal laws once the principles of public law laid down by the Constitution
have been secured Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/7/1993, "Fibraca
Constructora SCA. v. Comisi6n T6cnica Mixta de Salto Grande," Colecci6n Oficial
de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1993-316-1669)
(Arg.).
168. Of the nine justices that sat in the Court at the time of decision, three of
them - Justices Petracchi, Fayt and Belluscio - took part in the 1987 decision, all of
them concurring in the judgment. In 2005, however, only Petracchi and Fayt voted.
Belluscio, whose retirement was imminent, excused himself and took no part in the
decision.
169. Not that many people did not think so back in 1987, Justice Bacque being the
most visible example. It is debatable whether the laws were constitutional in their
time, but now I refer to the concrete issue of the opinion of the Court as an
institution and not of the individuals, even those who might happen to sit in the
Court.
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water had run under the bridge: The army had lost a lot of resources
and almost all possibilities of influencing politics, this last point being
highly positive; human rights NGOs expanded their presence through
grass-roots activism and political lobby. Sectors sympathetic to the
1970s guerrilla had come closer to power. In terms of rule of law,
there was constitutional reform, with a turn towards
internationalization of human rights protection, but without altering
in any way rights entrenched in the first part of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court had continued to uphold the Due Obedience and
Full-Stop Laws, even after constitutional reform. 70 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights had ruled that self-amnesty laws
covering crimes against humanity were against the Inter-American
Convention of Human Rights. 7' Congress had used the mechanism
provided by Article 75, section 22 of the Constitution to grant
constitutional hierarchy or constitutional standing to some treaties,
and particularly, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity. 172 Last, but not least, Congress had declared null and void
the Due Obedience Law and the Full-Stop Law.
173
Taking a closer look, not much had occurred in regard to the
constitutional status of the so-called impunity laws. Article 18 of the
Argentina Constitution provides that "no inhabitant of the Nations
may be punished without previous trial based on a law enacted before
the act that gives rise to the process .... ." Thus, whatever the impact
of the political and legal development on the current constitutional
status of the laws, those who had benefited from them seemed to be
guarded against retroactive application. Moreover, when many of the
beneficiaries were released from responsibility, the corresponding
170. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], <13/8/1998>, "Suirez Mason,
Carlos Guillermo," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [Fallos] (1998-321-2031) (Arg.).
171. Barrios Altos v. Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Mar. 14, 2001, available at
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf> (visited Mar. 31, 2008).
172. By Law No. 25778 (2003).
173. By Law No. 25779, following immediately the grant of "constitutional
hierarchy" or "constitutional standing" to the Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. It should be
noticed that both laws had been repealed by Congress in 1998, by Law No. 24952,
with clear conscience on the part of the representatives that such repeal could only
have effects towards the future but in no way it could alter the effects both laws had
already produced.
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criminal right to prosecute had already been extinguished by the
Supreme Court.
But then the Supreme Court, with five sitting justices appointed
by, or politically aligned with, the current government - whose
sympathies towards the guerrilla movement had not been hidden 7' -
decided to jump into the political fray to undo the "mistake" that
their predecessors had made in 1987. The most redemptive style of
adjudication was just about to be displayed. So redemptive that it
clearly exceeded the Constitution itself. Was it, finally, the end of an
era and a very late confirmation of the "new beginning?" If so, what
should we make of traditional criminal guarantees that were affected
by the Court's decision?
i. Pro-Majoritarian Effort to Restore the Lost Legitimacy or a
Constitutional Revolution by the Judiciary?
A cynic would conclude that the Court's decision in the Simon
case is simply the result of a very long political battle ending in
victor's justice at the price of institutional integrity. Regrettably, this
assertion holds true to a certain degree. The price paid was a
constitutional revolution, led by the majority of the Supreme Court.
However, it is always possible to attempt a more sympathetic reading
of the Court's decision in this case, one that goes beyond the
particular interest of the parties - in a broad sense - and presents
the decision in light of the historical and political processes that are
described in the preceding paragraphs. Maybe in retrospect one can
gain a deeper understanding, though not a justification, of the Court's
decision.
This article does not present in detail the Simon decision,
composed of eight different opinions (seven concurrent and one
dissenting, including in addition two advisory opinions by the
174. See, e.g., Juan Gasparini, El Nuevo Presidente Argentino y El Pasado
Reciente: Kirchner y la Tercera Batalla de los Montoneros, available at
<http://www.lafogata.org/
003arg/arg6/artercera.htm> (visited Dec. 6, 2006); see also Joaquin Morales Sola,
Menem, Montoneros y el Error de Comparar el Hoy con el Ayer, available at
<http://www.clubdel
progreso.com/index.php? sec=04_05&sid=24&id=1838> (visited Dec. 6, 2006); James
Nielson, El Regreso de los Montoneros, available at
<http://www.rionegro.com.ar/arch200512/16/ ol6f02.php> (visited Dec. 6, 2006);
Argentina: The Slow Battle for Justice, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2006, available at
<http://www.economist.com/ displayStory.cfm?storyjid=7912930> (visited Dec. 6,
2006).
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Procurador General de la Nacion) and extending 353 pages in length.
Necessarily, many very important issues discussed by the Justices will
be omitted in this discussion, and I hope not much is lost in the
process since the focus of this paper is not on the decision itself, but
on how it fits into the larger constitutional picture."'
In summary, some of the Justices attempted to prove that, at the
time the laws were enacted, Argentina's Congress was forbidden to
pass laws of that kind. This interpretative approach was the "non-
retroactive approach." It is remarkable, however, that most of the
Justices that pursued this line of argument, did not rely on
Argentina's constitutional rules, as Justice Bacque had tried to do in
his dissenting opinion in Camps."6 Instead, they based their
arguments on international conventional'77  and customary
obligations.178
As far as conventional obligations were concerned, the majority
had a hard time trying to find proper grounds for its assertion that
Article 18's prohibition of ex post facto criminal laws had not been
violated. No treaty establishing a prohibition against amnesty for
crimes against humanity was binding on Argentina at the time of the
175. I will speak of "majority" here in a somewhat loose sense. While the opinions
of the Justices diverged in numerous respects, it is clear that there was a "majority"
holding for the unconstitutionality of the so-called "amnesty laws".
176. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 22/6/1987, "Camps, Ram6n Juan
Alberto y otros, / Causa incoada en virtud del decreto 280/84 del Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional" Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[Fallos] (1987-310-1162) (Arg.). In such a long decision, it is striking that there are so
few references to rules contained in the national Constitution. All the concurring
opinions of the plurality amount to 247 different sections in the decision. Of those,
only seven sections (less than 3 percent) make very brief and secondary references to
arguments of internal constitutional law that, in the justices' opinions, lent support to
their finding of unconstitutionality. See id. at § 13 (Petracchi, J., in a very restricted
sense); §§ 25, 26, 28 (Maqueda, J.); § 19 (Highton de Nolasco, J.); §§ 23-24
(Lorenzetti, J.). Justice Zaffaroni uses sections 23 and 24 of his opinion to discard
arguments based on constitutional provisions that had been invoked to support the
unconstitutionality of the Due Obedience and Full-Stop Law; and Justice Argibay
devotes section 16 of her opinion to show that Article 18 of the Constitution is not
violated by the solution favored by the plurality. That is as much as it is said about
the Constitution in the plurality's opinions.
177. Id. at §§ 16-33 (Petracchi, J.); §§ 14, 16-27, 38, 40, 45-46 (Boggiano, J.); §§ 18-
19, 32-34, 58-75, 77-78, 85-88, 95 (Maqueda, J.); §§ 12, 14-16, 26-27, 30, 32 (Zaffaroni
J.); §§ 13-14, 18, 20-31 (Highton de Nolasco, J.); §§ 17-18, 21, 23, 29, 31-32
(Lorenzetti J.); §§ 14, 16-17 (Argibay J.).
178. Id. at §§ 28-29, 36, 38, 41, 45-46 (Boggiano, J.); §§ 36-50, 56-57, 62, 89, 91, 93-
95 (Maqueda, J.); § 32 (Zaffaroni, J.); § 31 (Highton de Nolasco, J.); §§ 19, 32
(Lorenzetti, J.).
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enactment of the Due Obedience Law. Article 15.2 of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights might have
assisted the Court had Argentina not reserved the application of this
provision, limiting its application to instances where Article 15.2 does
not conflict with Article 18 of the Argentine Constitution. Of course,
it could be argued that the Inter American Convention on Human
Rights ("Convention"), as interpreted by the Inter American Court in
the Barrios Altos case, was binding at the time.179 But, as it happens,
the Convention has no provision forbidding amnesty. On the
contrary, Article 9 provides for the prohibition of the application of
ex post facto criminal laws. And the Court's interpretation of the
Convention in Barrios Altos refers to self-amnesty laws, not to
amnesties decided by duly elected democratic governments9
The vague terms of the Inter American Court's judgment were
used by the Supreme Court to ground its assertion that Congress, in
1987, could not have constitutionally enacted Due Obedience and
Full-Stop Laws. The relevant portion of the Inter American Court's
opinions reads as follows,
This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on
prescription and the establishment of measures designed to
eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended
to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible
for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of
them prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights
recognized by international human rights law.
Taken out of context, the fragment may seem to support the
Court's conclusion in Simon. But the paragraph refers to all amnesty
provision under decision in the instant case. References to the "self-
amnesty" character of the laws are found elsewhere in the ruling,"8
and, in any case, this portion of the opinion is dictum that, as such, is
not controlling.83
179. See Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 171, at §§ 42, 43, 44.
180. Id. at §§ 75-85 (Fayt, J., dissenting).
181. See id. generally.
182. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, "Simon, Julio Hector y
otros," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[Fallos] (2005-328-20456) (Arg.) §§ 42-44.
183. Later on the Inter American Court extended the dictum of Barrios Altos and
has explicitly turned it into a general rule, applicable to all cases in which states
attempt to grant amnesties for crimes against humanity, regardless of whether they
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The Supreme Court's decision in Simon fares no better when it
comes to customary obligations. First, one cannot help but wonder
how the Justices, who in 1987 held the laws constitutional, may have
overlooked something so important as the rules of jus cogens. Again,
as Justice Fayt remarks,' Justice Petracchi expressly analyzed the
international obligations of Argentina in his concurring opinion in
Camps and found no incompatibility whatsoever. Second, as Legarre
has pointed out, the Justices in Simon assumed that such customary
obligation existed, instead of carefully proving this proposition."' If
anything, evidence of customary international practice points in the
opposite direction, with various legal systems resorting to the amnesty
solution in the recent years.1" Finally, it is dubious that a liberal
system of criminal law, such as the one established by Argentina's
Constitution, should accommodate different sources of law, inclusive
of customary practice. Criminal law has to be certa and scripta.87
Customary international law is neither, at least not to the extent
necessary to assure certainty in criminal prosecutions. Thus, it is
difficult to accept that customary international law can be regarded as
a normative source on which the punishment of individual depends,
however despicable the crimes attributed to such persons may be.
are self-amnesties or amnesties granted by posterior democratic governments. See
IACHR, 09/26/2006, Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, sections 111-114 & 120, available
at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulosl
seriec_154_ing.pdf> (visited April 8, 2008). Despite what the Court holds in
Sections 119-120, the decision does not alter in any way the arguments I make in the
text regarding the problems raised by the violation of national constitutional norms,
which in the case of Argentina- conditions the validity of the alleged conventional
international obligations.
184. See id at §76 (Fayt, J., dissenting).
185. See Santiago Legarre, Crimes Against Humanity, Reasonableness and The
Law: The Simon Case in the Supreme Court of Argentina, 5:3 CHINESE J.I.L. 723, 731
(2006).
186. Among others, the cases of Spain, South Africa, and Uruguay can be brought
to attention. Id. at 731-32.See also Alfonso Santiago, La Dimension Temporal del
Derecho y el Conciente y Deliberado Apartamiento de los Principios de Legalidad e
Irretroactividad en Materia Penal por Parte de la Corte Suprema Argentina en el
Caso Simon, 205 EL DERECHO 719 (2005).
187. The principle of nullum crimen sine praevia lege poenaY, as interpreted in
Argentina, demands that criminal law be written (scripta), exhaustive in the
description of the criminal conduct, as opposed to merely general (certa), and not
based on analogy (stficta). For a brief elaboration of these ideas, see Corte Suprema
de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, "Simon, Julio Hector y otros," Colecci6n Oficial de
Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (2005-328-20456) (Arg.),
at §§ 62-63 (Fayt, J., dissenting).
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Justice Boggiano wrote that the reference to the international
treaties made in the Constitution would be useless if the application
of such treaties were blocked or modified by interpretations based on
one or another national legal system.' 88 For instance, the reference
would be useless if the application of the principle forbidding statutes
of limitations were to depend on its conformity with the principle of
legality contained in Article 18 of Argentina's Constitution.189 The
recovery of damages, Boggiano continues, is insufficient to comply
with current requirements of international law,'9 and the
imperativeness of such international norms renders them applicable
even retroactively9'
Justice Argibay, using Articles 26 and 28 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, points out that the Argentine
State could not excuse itself from applying retroactively an
international convention intended to be applied, precisely, in that
way.' 92 There is no point in arguing that the prohibition of the
application of expost facto criminal laws is not violated by the Court,
if one believes that no matter what, the State had to apply the treaty
retroactively. Unfortunately, Argibay provides no explanation why
the articles of the Vienna Convention must be applied against the
188. Id. at §14 (Boggiano, J.).
189. Id. The reasoning is fallacious. Since the reference to the treaties is made by
the Constitution itself, the application of such treaties would not be frustrated by
"interpretations based on one or another national legal system" - as Justice Boggiano
would have us believe - but by the Constitution's own provisions. It is the
Constitution that provides for the constitutional standing of some treaties, and it can
perfectly establish - as it does, in my opinion - that in case of collision, the
Constitution would trump the treaties. From the fact that the Constitution grants
constitutional hierarchy - with the caveats already referred in the main text - to some
treaties, it does not follow that the Constitution has resigned its position as "the
supreme law of the land" or that it is impossible to displace an international norm
when it contradicts the Constitution. The same argument used by Justice Boggiano
can be formulated, more persuasively, in exactly the opposite way: "The
Constitution's declaration as the 'supreme law of the land,' as well as the provision
that mandates that all treaties must conform to the principles of public law laid down
by the Constitution and the express prohibition that the treaties abrogate rights and
principles declared in the first part of the Constitution - among which the two
previous assertions are contained - would all be useless if their application were
frustrated by interpretations based in one or another international norm. For
instance, if the prohibition of the retroactive application of criminal laws (Article 18),
were to be trumped by the principle that mandates retroactive punishment."
190. Id at § 25.
191. Id. at section 45.
192. Id. at section 17 (Argibay, J., concurring).
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Constitutional provision. 193 Especially, when Article 46 of the same
international treaty provides some relevant exceptions to the rule on
which Justice Argibay based her reasoning.194 Justices Zaffaroni and
Lorenzetti resorted to the idea of the "principle of universal
jurisdiction" as a new, supervenient development that should
influence decisively the outcome of the case.195 Since, according to
such principle, the persons suspected of having committed crimes
against humanity could be prosecuted and judged by any Nation, the
dignity of the Argentine Republic demands that they are prosecuted
in our own country.
Additionally, Justice Lorenzetti emphasized that the level of
evolution of humanitarian international law, appraised today,
demands the resolution of the constitutionality of the amnesty laws.
196
Another device used by some of the Justices, when confronting
the undeniable reality that provisions of the human rights treaties (as
interpreted by international organs) collided with the fundamental
rights and principles of Argentina's constitutional structure, was to
interpret the constitutional limitation of section 22 of Article 75 (that
the human rights treaties "do not repeal any Section of the First Part
of this Constitution, and are to be understood as complementing the
rights and guarantees recognized herein") in a rather peculiar way.197
Specifically, that the Constitutional Convention of 1994 actually
checked for incompatibilities between human rights treaties in
193. Id.
194. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 46(1) ("[a] State may
not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in
violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties
as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of
its internal law of fundamental importance'), 46(2) ("[a] violation is manifest if it
would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in
accordance with normal practice and in good faith.") May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (emphasis added). It seems to me that Article 27 of the Constitution of the
Argentina Republic is, objectively, an internal law of fundamental importance. So is
Article 18 and the prohibition of retroactive laws in criminal matters. Normal
practice would have made evident, to any state conducting itself in good faith, that an
international treaty that provided for the violation of these two principles of the
Argentina Constitution would have triggered the exception to the prohibition of
invoking internal laws to excuse the breaching of a conventional obligation.
195. Id. at § 32 (Zaffaroni, J., concurring); id. at § 29 (Lorenzetti, J., concurring).
196. Id. at § 23 (Lorenzetti, J., concurring).
197. Id. at §§ 10, 12 (Boggiano, J., concurring); id. at § 17 (Lorenzetti, J.,
concurring).
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question and the Constitution, and found that there were none.'98 The
Justices held further that this sort of determination would be of a
special constitutional nature, emanating from the people through the
delegates, and could not be contradicted by the Supreme Court.'9
According to this narrative, the Constitution would not be defeated
by treaties because the Framers checked for inconsistencies and
found none: end of story. Call this the "theory of the Framers'
compatibility check."
But things are not so easy, because, as Simon clearly shows, there
are a number of cases in which inconsistencies can, and will, arise.
The 1994 delegates could not possibly check the infinite occurrences
of potential conflicts. It is only in the frame of an actual case that such
interpretive problems may arise and, subsequently, be resolved.
The Court should not surrender its power to gauge the
interaction of the Constitution vis a vis international human rights
treaties. Such a maneuver takes an erroneous stance in terms of
constitutional language. The Constitution does not inform, it
prescribes. Its language is neither descriptive nor informative, it is
normative.
To illustrate my point I will borrow an example from the
National Academy of Law in Argentina. When Article 15 of the 1853
Constitution states "In the Argentine Nation there are no slaves," it is
not informing us of the factual inexistence of persons subject to
servitude; it is abolishing slavery."l Similarly, section 22, Article 75, is
not informing of an intellectual activity of the Framers; it is
preserving the supremacy of the Constitution in the eventuality of a
conflict with a treaty of "constitutional hierarchy" or "standing." 20 ' So,
as a matter of legal theory, the theory of the Framers' compatibility
check is flawed.
This "theory' is also mistaken as a matter of legal history. As
debates in the Constitutional Convention reflect, the delegates did
not worry about compatibility, but rather, intended that the
Constitution trump conflicting treaty language.'
198. Id.
199. Id
200. Dictamen Academia Nacional de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de Buenos
Aires, Caso Arancibia Cavel, point 8; available at <http://www.academiadederecho.
org.ar/memoria.htm> (visited Dec. 6, 2006); also available at <http://www.
revistacriterio.com.ar/artweb.php?cuerpo=l&artwebjid=30> (visited Dec. 6, 2006).
201. Id.
202. See infra, nn. 205 and 206, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 31:2
Constitutional Changes, Transitional Justice, and Legitimacy
The consequences of the doctrine advocated by the Court in
Simon are revolutionary. Every time a constitutional provision
implicates a provision of a human rights treaty with "constitutional
standing," the judge should assume that there are no
incompatibilities, no matter how blatant they might be, and then try
to make both rules equally applicable and effective. This doctrine
opens space in the forty-three articles of the Argentine Constitution,
in spite of the express prohibitions of 1994, that now can be filled by
current or future treaties with "constitutional standing," or - as in
Simon - by alleged international customs.
This is especially problematic in the case of provisions that
prescribe, in the form of rules, 3 such as Article 18.20 In such cases,
there is no possibility of interpretive integration. Rules are all or
nothing. Of course, there can be exceptions to rules. This is, precisely,
the point at stake.
Since the Justices cannot admit the plain derogation - or
invalidity - of a constitutional provision that conflicts with an
international norm, they are required, by the described theory, to
introduce exceptions to constitutional rules. But, as it happens, the
Constitutional Convention was forbidden from making these kinds of
far-reaching reforms. Are the Justices of the Supreme Court
authorized to take the stand and do what the Framers could not and
did not want to do - given both that the Constitution was reformed so
recently and the intention of the Framers was clear? The theory that
is the subject of this analysis, opens a big gap in the Constitution,
forming an empty "bubble" that can be filled with different
interpretive elements: Jurisprudence, whether or not applicable to the
203. See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967);
see also ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 48 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2002).
204. Let us remember that Article 18 provides that "no inhabitant of the Nations
may be punished without previous trial based on a law enacted before the act that
gives rise to the process." Since the law can only be, temporally, prior or posterior to
the act that gives rise to the process, the previous trial mandated by the provision, can
be conducted in only two different ways in this respect: It is either based on a law that
is prior to the facts thus complying with Article 18, or it is based in a law that is
subsequent - and thus, Article 18 is violated. The guarantee against ex post facto
criminal laws does not admit degrees of compliance (in the way principles do; see,
e.g., ALEXY, supra note 202, at 47-48): It is either observed or violated, but it does not
seem plausible to think that the guarantee can be respected to a certain extent. It
does sound strange to say that an individual has been convicted after a trial that
respected "a little" or "a lot, but not completely" his guarantee against ex post facto
criminal laws. This is, in my view, an all-or-nothing kind of issue.
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case, dicta, opinions issued by political bodies, among other resources
taken from the international jurisprudence. We can call this the
"constitutional bubble effect."
Justice Petracchi, quite understandably since he had voted for
the constitutionality of the laws in 1987, did not bother to attempt a
non-retroactive justification or to use the "theory of the Framers'
compatibility check." Instead, he chose to follow a different path. For
him, the 1994 Constitutional Reform signaled the starting point of a
process of fundamental change in Argentina's constitutional law. The
reader should notice that Petracchi does not say that the 1994 reform
itself was the change, but that it started an evolutionary process that,
based on the evolution of international human rights law, no longer
authorized the State to make decisions whose outcome is the
renunciation of the right to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes
against humanity.Y It was that the domestic law was now clearly
limited, and cannot support the grant of amnesties or pardons for
certain crimes and, therefore, those who were benefited by Due
Obedience and Full-Stop cannot invoke either the prohibition on
retroactive application of criminal laws or res iudicata. 2°6
Justice Petracchi did openly what other Justices tried to hide: he
applied retroactively criminal rules against indicted persons, in clear
violation of Article 18. He tried to justify his move through a
"fundamental change" in Argentina's constitutional law. There is an
Ackermanian flavor to his argument; the idea of a "constitutional
moment" is present throughout his opinion. Basically, his opinion
holds that the formal amendment of 1994 opened the way for the
introduction of evolving notions of international law in constitutional
interpretation. The politics of human rights would fill the interpretive
gap.2' In similar vein, the brief filed by the Procurador General
Becerra, contains a specific citation of Ackerman's FoundationsM in
205. Id. at §§ 14, 15 (Petracchi, J., concurring).
206. Id. at §§ 15, 31.
207. Notice that Justice Petracchi relies not only on jurisdictional opinions of
international tribunals, but also on the mere recommendations and informs of
politicalorgans of the international system of human rights protecion. See, e.g., id. at
§§ 20, 21, 33 (Petracchi, J., concurring) (referring to the Inter American Commission
of Human Rights and to the U.N. Committee for Human Rights). Justice Fayt
criticized this usage of political opinions and recommendations. See id. at § 86 (Fayt,
J., dissenting).
208. See id. at Point A, at 23 (first opinion of the Procurador General de la
Nacion). The advisory opinion can be found along with the decision at the Supreme
Court's website (www.csjn.gov.ar).
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support of the idea that a change in the interpretive paradigm of the
Constitution had occurred and that such "constitutional moment" had
been explicitly recognized and embedded in the Constitution in
1994.209
The problem is that both Procurador Becerra and Justice
Petracchi invoke the idea of the constitutional moment but, even
accepting, ex hypothesis, that the theory is applicable to Argentina's
constitutional history, they fail to show how this moment came
about 210 or that its contents actually correspond to their narrative. The
Delegates in 1994 were not authorized to introduce any changes to
the first 35 articles of the Constitution. That limitation included the
prohibition on retroactive application of criminal laws (Article 18),
and the supremacy of the Constitution over all other normative
sources of law, including treaties (Articles 27 and 31). The law calling
for the Convention, enacted following the Pacto de Olivos, expressly
forbade introducing the aforementioned reforms, and declared that
any extra-limitation of the Convention would be null and void.21' The
delegates were aware of this limitation in their mandate, and when
one delegate proposed an amendment to Article 75, section 22 (the
one on which the argumentation of the plurality of the Court relies
heavily) forbidding pardons or amnesties for crimes against humanity,
the proposal was rejected.212 In 1998, Congress recognized that no
change that allowed the nullification of the existing law had occurred.
Thus, Congress repealed the Due Obedience Law and Full-Stop Law,
but it did not nullify them.213 In 1999, the Supreme Court ruled
209. In this point, Procurador Becerra and Justice Petracchi part ways: while for
Becerra the 1994 Constitutional Convention had been the culminant point of the
"constitutional moment," in Petracchi's opinion the Convention was just the starting
point of the process of change. See id.
210. In his dissent, Justice Fayt replies to the supposed "change of paradigm"
that, according to Justice Petracchi and Procurador Becerra - and then Procurador
Righi, in the second opinion - had occurred since 1987. Point by point, Fayt shows
how each and every relevant legal norm invoked by Petracchi was already in force in
1987, and that the "new" paradigm is not new at all. See generally id. (Fayt, J.,
dissenting).
211. Law No. 24309 art. 6-7, supra note 151.
212. See Badeni, supra note 165, at [X] point II (arguing that delegate Maria
Lucero made the proposal mentioned in the main text, and that it was rejected; and
recalling that, when some delegates criticized the proposed draft of section 22,
Article 75, delegates Maria Martino de Rubeo and Horacio Rosatti, expressly
clarified that the proposed text put treaties over laws, but not over the Constitution).
213. In the debate in Congress, previous to the enactment of Law No.24952
(repealing the Due Obedience and Full-Stop Laws), the representatives admitted
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unconstitutional a reform introduced in 1994, because it considered
that the delegates had overstepped their mandate by modifying an
article that was not among the "authorized themes" of Law No.
24309.14
Until 2001, there was really no public movement around the
eventual nullification of the Due Obedience and Full-Stop Laws, nor
general debate about the topic. Judge Gabriel Cavallo's decision,
which held boths laws unconstitutional mainly on-grounds partially
different from those relied on by the Simon decision25 - was probably
the first and lonely call of attention about this interpretative stance.
Even after 2001, the issue of the validity of the 1994 revision did not
arise in any electoral campaigns. If anything happened in 1994 and
after, if any "constitutional moment" took place, it wasn't of the kind
assumed in the Simon decision. If anything, evidence seems to point
in the opposite direction: the public wasn't really concerned with this
particular point, and the Framers did not intend to subordinate
constitutional rights to international human rights treaties. Although
there were a movement towards a greater recognition and protection
of human rights, this movement did not encompass the obliteration of
fundamental guarantees of the domestic criminal law. Likewise, this
movement did not seek to alter in any way the existent hierarchy of
norms.
It was not until 2003 that Congress assumed the role of "speaker
that, due to the principle of application of the most benign criminal law, or
prohibition of ex post facto criminal laws that prejudice the indicted, a new
indictment of the perpetrators was not possible). See Diario de Sesiones de la
Camara de Diputados, 7a reunion, Mar. 24, 1998, at 882, and Sesion 5a, Mar. 25,
1998, at 1438, 1442; § 20 (citation by Fayt, J., dissenting). Moreover, they decided to
simply repeal the laws, and not to declare them null and void, despite the existence of
international treaties now used to support the alleged nullity.
214. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 19/8/1999, "Carlos Santiago Fayt v.
Estado Nacional," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [Fallos] (1999-322-1408) (Arg.).
215. See Juzgado Nacional en los Criminal y Correcional Federal N. 4, Mar. 6,
2001, [2001-C] LA LEY 510 (2001), available at <http://www.espaciosjuridicos.com.ar/
datos/JURISPRUDENCIA/Del%20Cerro%20y%20Simon-SUSTRACCION.zip>
(visited Mar. 31, 2008). Judge Gabriel Cavallo decided Simon at trial level. His
resolution would be subsequently affirmed by the Federal Chamber of Appeals and
by the Supreme Court. His decision relied heavily on Article 29 of the Constitution,
which forbids and makes null and void any acts by which the Legislature concedes to
the Executive tyrannical powers, or extraordinary powers, or the sum of all public
power. His thesis was that not only that such acts of "tyrannical delegation" are
forbidden and, thus, nullified, but also that the acts imply the concrete exercise of
such tyrannical powers.
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of the People." Without much justification but for their own
judgment about what was morally right concerning violations of
human rights, Congress enacted Law No. 25779, declaring "null and
void" the "amnesty laws."
The main line of argumentation in the Congressional debates
was the so-called "new paradigm" of international human rights law.
The new law was codified on September 3, 2003. The Senate elections
were held after that date and the deputy elections took place before
and after the law's enactment, some in April and August and most in
September, October, and November. Presidential elections occurred
in April, but neither Nestor Kirchner nor Carlos Menem, the two
major contenders, included the issue in their respective electoral
platforms.216 Although there were numerous political opportunities to
air this issue, the notion of the "new paradigm" had not been widely
discussed until it was taken up by Congress. Clearly, Congress could
not legitimately claim to have received a popular mandate to nullify
the laws in question. But Congress, with the sympathy of the
President, did just that and went ahead with its own form of
revisionism.
No branch of government assumed the "preservationist" role."'
Nobody called the public's attention about what was being done to
the Constitution. There was only one ruling of unconstitutionality, by
the Federal Court of Appeals of San Martin in the Bignone case.
This latest maneuver by Congress was one in a long line of
majoritarian decisions: in 1987 Congress passed the "amnesty laws";
in 1998 Congress repealed both laws; and in 2003, Congress nullified
them. The Supreme Court always went along with the decisions. Of
course, most people were happy to see the perpetrators of heinous
crimes go to jail. So, the Law No. 25779 did not generate so much
protest among the general public. But the public is not much aware of
216. Electoral platforms of both candidates in the 2003 Presidential election are
available, in Spanish, at <http://www.pjn.gov.ar/cne/download/Partidos%20
Nacionales/Alianza%20Frente%20para%201a%20victoria/Alianza%20frente%20par
a%201a%20victoria.pdf> (President Kirchner's platform) and <http://www.pjn.gov.
ar/cne/download/Partidos%20Nacionales/Alianza%20frente%20por%201a%201ealta
d/Alianza%20frente%20por%201a%201ealtad.pdf> (former President Menem's
platform) (both visited Dec. 7, 2006). There is not one mention in either platform to
the issue of past violations of human rights.
217. See ACKERMAN, supra note 80, at 10.
218. FedSanMartin, Sala I, 11/22/2004, Bignone, Reynaldo B.A. et aL, 03/02/2005
LA LEY 15 (2005).
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the institutional consequences of what the Court did, nor, thus, seems
to have consented to its constitutional lawmaking.
I have described the revolutionary side of the Simon decision.
The Justices took two different paths to reach the same solution.
Some of them applied retroactively norms in blatant contradiction to
the fundamental guarantee of Article 18, and thereby, reformulated
the constitutional hierarchy of norms to subordinate the Constitution
to certain international treaties. Others preferred to insert exceptions
in the Constitution, through the tool of "constitutional bubbles,"
which can be filled accordingly to the necessities of each case. Both
approaches alter the Constitution. In this way, they sowed the seeds
of doctrines that will permit the modification of the Constitution in
unforeseeable ways.2"9
Add now that the Simon ruling, in its retroactive aspects, is a
completely ad-hoc decision that cannot be repeated in the future.
Because the Constitution only forbids retroactive application of
provisions that eliminate statutes of limitations or prohibit certain
amnesties or pardons, and such provision are already a part of
Argentina's Constitutional system, any acts that amount to crimes
against humanity that can be committed in the future will have been
committed after the existence of the mentioned provision and, hence,
they will not raise any retroactivity issue. It is virtually impossible that
the Simon doctrine, as far as the retroactive application of criminal
laws is concerned, could ever be applied again. The Simon decision is
relevant only to its facts: it was handed down to send a number of
specific individuals to prison for crimes committed during the last
dictatorship.
This is a cynical reading of the case, and as explained above there
is yet another explanation for the Court's reasoning. The political
process that resulted in the Supreme Court ruling can be viewed as a
majoritarian effort, backed by the Justices, to restore the legitimacy
that was lost when Alfonsin's visions of corrective justice was
dismantled. After all, Alfonsin's initial proposal, the one that people
voted for in the crucial election of 1983, was that those in charge of
the repression - the generals and high-rank officers - would be
punished and that lower-ranked officials would be spared with the
exception of those who had committed atrocious crimes or had gone
219. The decision raises many other problematic constitutional law issues that I
cannot analyze here. For instance, the possibility that Congress does not simply
repeal laws, but declares them null and void with general effects.
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beyond the orders.20  And Simon will, most likely, have this very
same practical effect.
Simon has also paved the way for the nullification of some of
Menem's pardons.221 Ultimately, the result will be that those who gave
the orders to perpetrate crimes against humanity and the perpetrators
of these crimes will be sent to prison.222 The symbolism of the victory
of the rule of law over the most egregious violators will be restored
for the "new beginning."
The fact that the Due Obedience Law was enacted under
pressure really influenced the way it was perceived by the people,
generating much protest. Had the measure been taken in the absence
of a perceived threat, it may have gained more legitimacy in the eyes
of the public. Even in that event, it is unclear whether the People
would have accepted amnesty as a just solution. In the words of
JusticeMaqueda,
[Elven when amnesties have been associated with concepts such as
peace and compassion, perpetrators of grave crimes have taken
advantage of amnesties to achieve impunity. Hence ... States ...
are still obliged to prosecute and punish such crimes, even if.. .it is
necessary to nullify such amnesties. In case the powers of the State
are put in significant risk, the State may, in such an emergency,
220. SeeMCSHERRY, supra note 13, at 111. SeeaIsoNINO, supra note 13, at 63.
221. Recently, the Supreme Court, by a 4-2 vote, ruled the pardons granted to
military officers were unconstitutional. The decision is very problematic, since it
implies the overruling of a prior decision of the Court in the same case and
concerning the same person. The authority of res iudicata has been seriously affected
by the decision. See Corta Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/13/2007, "Mazzeo, Julio
Lilo y otros," available at <www.csjn.gov.ar> (this decision is not yet paginated in the
official Fallos report). The previous decision in the same case, which has been
overruled, is Riveros. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 11/12/1990, "Riveros,
Santiago Omar y otros," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia
de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1990-313-1392) (Arg.). A serious analysis of the decision is far
beyond the limits of this essay and deserves a separate study.
222. Even if, arguably, most of the people that took part in the repression actually
committed atrocious crimes, it is highly likely for a number of reasons, that only the
most egregious offenders will be prosecuted which was, incidentally, Alfonsin's idea
in the first place. The reasons that may lead to a limited prosecution include: death
of both the perpetrators and those strongly interested in the prosecutions; lack of
witnesses and evidence as a result of the passing of time; and lack of political will. In
the case of the paradigmatic offenders, evidence is easier to obtain, and ii is more
likely that affected people are alive and actively pursuing the punishment. Another
factor that may account for this result is the political incentive that the government
has to prosecute prominent repressors. It may bring the administration some good
publicity and some votes for the party. Low-visibility cases, on the other hand, yield
low-benefits.
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postpone such obligation, which will have to be carried out when
,,223the danger is over....
The amnesty was not granted voluntarily, which means that
morally, it was no amnesty at all. Of course, it does not follow
necessarily that the amnesty was legally deficient. That is a different
sort of argument. In any case, it seems clear that coerced forgiveness
is a self-contradiction, and this feature of the amnesty laws played an
important role in shaping the issue of amnesty in Argentina's recent
history. Unfortunately, this form of justice required the sacrifice of
the Constitution, in terms of the individual rights of the indicted and
of the constitutionally legitimacy of official government acts.
IV. Conclusion: the Death of the Amnesty Laws and the
Question of Legitimacy
Throughout this article, I have argued that Alfonsin did not have
the option of renouncing the prosecution of the leaders of the military
repression of the 1970s to, instead, go down the constitutional law-
making path. I have also argued that he did want to enact a new
Constitution. Indeed, he had plans for a somewhat radical departure
from the political traditions of the country. The military trials
acquired a legal and political priority. Later, the changing political
situation as well as pressure from the military forced him to pass
through Congress the Full-Stop Law and the Due Obedience Law.
With the passage of these laws, the possibility of a new Constitution
faded away. The symbolic power of Alfonsin's "new beginning,"
embodied in the rule of law, was erased by the grant of amnesty to
certain military officials and by Menem's subsequent decision to
pardon many others. I have also analyzed the Supreme Court's
behavior in response to these political developments in two different
instances, specifically in the Camps and Simon decisions.
I believe that Alfonsin's clear stance on human rights violations
in 1983, and the epic character of that election, may have provided
grounds to justify the Supreme Court's overruling Camps. The
Court's decision in Simon may turn out to be consistent with the
political realities of Argentina's history: Alfonsin had made clear in
223. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, "Julio H6ctor Sim6n y
otros," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[Fallos] (2005-328-2056) (Arg.), at § 81 (Maqueda, J., concurring) (citing Geoffrey
Robertson's Crimes Against Humanityin support of the assertion).
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1983 that he did not expect to punish all the perpetrators, and that
those who would have to face justice would be the commanders and
the perpetrators of atrocious crimes. This may be the platform that 52
percent of the people voted for in 1983; and its abandonment under
force majeur in 1987, may partially account for the massive
withdrawal of political support for Alfonsin's party, nation-wide. The
restoration of the structure that Alfonsin had chosen with the support
of the people, symbolizes the "new beginning," as well as the ultimate
reinstatement of the rule of law. Of course, the Court's decisions also
brings high costs in terms of institutional integrity, and the
constitutional guarantees of the indicted. Moreover, the general
perception that the amnesty laws did not really represent a moment
of true reconciliation but were instead the result of intense pressures
and military threats, may give additional weight to the idea that the
amnesty laws could be legitimately removed from the legal order,
exactly as if they had never existed. Forgiveness cannot be imposed:
It has to originate, however bitterly, from the political community
seeking to heal its wounds. "
But it does not follow that the Supreme Court had to overrule
Camps precisely as it did. The Court went far beyond what was
necessary and entered the terrain of illegitimate, judicial
constitutional revisionism. The Court could have used the bulk of
Justice Bacque's arguments, focused largely in Argentina's
constitutional law. Instead, the Justices resorted to international law,
taking pains to make the international norms fit the domestic
constitutional order. In this process, they created doctrine that
amounts to a true constitutional revolution.
Today, and in contradiction to the provisions of the 1994
Constitutional Convention, the Constitution has a strange
relationship with some international norms. It is precisely when our
Constitution conflicts with international norms that the it should
serve as the ultimate stronghold of human rights. Instead, the Court
decided to create constitutional bubbles, to be filled in by whoever
turns out to be the victor in the politics of human rights. After Simon,
in Argentina there are less individual interests that are outside the
reach of majoritarian decisions. Human rights, paradoxically, end up
the less guarded value. In conclusion, the Court reached what might
be deemed a morally legitimate outcome, but it did so by means
224. Once again, this is a moral argument that has an impact in the legal argument
but cannot, in itself, exhaust the question.
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whose institutional legitimacy is disputable. The issue of legitimacy
takes on greater force when one considers legal restraints and
procedural requirements to be the means toward political legitimacy.
The legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of means and ends is rooted, as
always, in a long story of a difficult past.
